Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-081
Thursday
25 April 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-081 *25 April 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Balkans: Germany's Kinkel Opens Meeting of B-H Federation *[DDP/ADN]* 1
Balkans: Tribunal Head Calls For Sanctions Against FRY *[AFP]* 1

ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Said Running for Parliament To Secure Future *[KOHA JONE 24 Apr]* 2
Albania: Appeals Court Upholds Screening Commission Vetoes *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 24 Apr]* ... 2

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Lilov Suggests Referendum on Joining NATO *[24 CHASA 25 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Politicians Said To Ignore Defense Industry *[KONTINENT 24 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Shipping Costs Delay Arrival of Russian Tanks *[24 CHASA 24 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Pirinski on Postponement of Trip to Skopje *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Bulgaria: Postponement of Pirinski's Skopje Visit Viewed *[KONTINENT 24 Apr]* 4
Bulgaria: Talks With Romania on Nuclear Safety Held *[Sofia Radio]* 4

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Daily on U.S. Bill on NATO, Slovakia *[LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Apr]* 5
Czech Republic: IFOR Soldiers Criticize Army Equipment *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 22 Apr]* 5
Czech Republic: Holan Admits 'Resistance' to GS Changes *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 23 Apr]* 6

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Government Said To Veto Hungarian as OSCE Head *[PRAVDA 24 Apr]* 7
Slovakia: 'Cold War' Between Government, Bishops Viewed *[NARODNA OBRODA 24 Apr]* 7
Slovakia: SDL's Fogas Denies 'Love Affair' With HZDS *[PRAVDA 20 Apr]* 8

HUNGARY

Hungary: Defense Committee Comments on Army Reform *[Budapest Radio]* 11
Hungary: 'Expert' Discusses NATO Membership Issues *[NEPSZAVA 24 Apr]* 11
Hungary: Article Views New Economic 'Superpolice' *[168 ORA 16 Apr]* 12

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Bildt Urges 'Fair Access' to Media for Parties, Candidates *[Sarajevo Radio]* 15
B-H: 'Independent' TV Channel Planned for Elections *[AFP]* 15
B-H: Prlic, Hungarian FM Discuss Peace Process, Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 16
B-H: Prlic, Hungary's Kovacs Reach Agreement *[Mostar Radio]* 16
B-H: PM Muratovic Discusses Economic Aid With U.S. Envoy *[Sarajevo Radio]* 17
B-H: Iranian Envoy Hands Rafsanjani Message to Izetbegovic *[IRNA]* 17
B-H: SDA Commitment to Integral State Questioned *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 17 Apr]* 17
B-H: Mostar Mayor Discusses May Elections With EU's Casado *[Sarajevo Radio]* 19
B-H: Muslim Air Force Flights 'Banned' for 'Indefinite Period' *[TANJUG]* 19
B-H: Federation, Serb Delegates Discuss Brcko Priorities *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20

B-H: Bosnia, Russia Struggle With Telecom Plans *[London COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL Mar]* 20
B-H: Gradacac Official Warns of 'Wave of Returnees' in Jun *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22
B-H: Bihac Police Locate Mass Grave Near Kulen Vakuf *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22
B-H: Muslims Said Planning Another Entry Into Doboj *[SRNA]* 23
B-H: Zvornik: Serbs Attempt Forced Entry Into Bosniak Homes *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
B-H: Serb TV Crew Finds 'No Trace' of 50 Muslims in Doboj *[Banja Luka TV]* 23
B-H: Serbs Protest Bosniak Attempts To Enter Serb Entity *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 24 Apr]* 23
B-H: Serb Refugees Prevented From Visiting Glamoc Graves *[TANJUG]* 24
B-H: Tribunal Head: Karadzic, Mladic Arrests Out of Question *[Banja Luka TV]* 24
B-H: Karadzic's Protection Measures Disclosed *[VECER 9 Apr]* 24
B-H: Kasagic Attends Sarajevo Meeting Chaired by Bildt *[TANJUG]* 24
B-H: Kasagic on Program for Reconstruction of Serb Republic *[SRNA]* 25
B-H: Kasagic, France's Godin View Donors' Conference, Elections *[Banja Luka Radio]* 25
B-H: Srbac Serb Socialists Want 'Close Ties' to Serbia *[Belgrade Radio]* 25
B-H: SPRS President Reports 'Physical Attacks' by SDS *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 24 Apr]* 26
B-H: SNS's Dodik Predicts Election Defeat for SDS *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 22 Apr]* 27
B-H: Magazine Banned by Serb Authorities Resumes Publication *[POLITIKA 21 Apr]* 28

CROATIA

Croatia: Council of Europe Votes To Admit Croatia *[Zagreb Radio]* 30
Croatia: Talks With FRY on Transport Links Viewed *[VJESNIK 20 Apr]* 30
Croatia: Official on Ethnic Structure of Srem-Barania *[TANJUG]* 31
Croatia: Intelligence Chief Discusses Coastal Strategy *[HRVATSKI OBZOR 22 Apr]* 32
Croatia: Slavonia Serbs Elect New Leader, List 'Tasks' *[FONET 23 Apr]* 35

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: East-West Dilemma in Defense Policy Analyzed *[DNEVNIK 20 Apr]* 36
FYROM: Frckovski Says Succession Rights Not Given Up *[MIC]* 37
FYROM: Crvenkovski Comments on Relations With FRY *[Belgrade TV]* 38
FYROM: Bulgarian Foreign Minister Postpones Visit *[MIC]* 38
FYROM: Postponement of Pirinski Visit Criticized *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 24 Apr]* 38
FYROM: Czech Foreign Minister Arrives in Skopje *[MIC]* 39
FYROM: PDPA-NDP Defeated in By-Election *[DNEVNIK 24 Apr]* 40

POLAND

Poland: Policeman Critically Hurt in Warsaw Bomb Explosion *[PAP]* 41
Poland: More Money Allocated for Forces in Bosnia *[Warsaw Radio]* 41
Poland: Reaction to NATO Secretary General's Visit *[RZECZPOSPOLITA, etc.]* 41
Poland: Ireland Supports Polish EU Membership *[Warsaw Radio]* 42
Poland: Defense Minister's Visit to Ukraine Previewed *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 24 Apr]* 42
Poland: Belarusian Opposition Leader Meets With Walesa *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 25 Apr]* 43
Poland: SDRP Leader: Oleksy Case Undermines Special Services *[Warsaw Radio]* 43
Poland: Lawyer Demands Return of Property to Kuklinski *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 20-21 Apr]* 44
Poland: Minister Discusses Social Security Reform Proposals *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Apr]* 44
Poland: Migration, Employment of Foreigners, Tourism *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 20-21 Apr]* 45

ROMANIA

Romania: Foreign Minister Assesses Visit to Moldova *[Bucharest Radio]* 46
Romania: DP's Roman Claims Iliescu Offers No Solutions *[AZI 19 Apr]* 46

Romania: UDMR Leader Marko Explains Policies *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 18 Apr]* 47

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: UN Rights Commission Report Condemns Authorities *[AFP]* 52
FRY: Central Bank Governor Vows Not To Print Money *[TANJUG]* 52
FRY: Democratic Party on Choice of IMF Negotiator *[FONET]* 53
FRY: Military Leaders Discuss Security Situation *[Belgrade Radio]* 53

Serbia

Serbia: Government, Metal Unions Agree To End Strike *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 24 Apr]* 53
Serbia: Four Terrorist Suspects Arrested in Belgrade *[TANJUG]* 54

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic's Visit to U.S. Said Proper *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 25 Apr]* 54
Montenegro: Federal Bank Governor Enjoys Full Support *[FONET]* 54
Montenegro: Authorities Reportedly Supporting Avramovic *[NASA BORBA 23 Apr]* 55
Montenegro: Helsinki Committee on Actions Against Catholics *[FONET]* 55

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serbian Officials Condemn Actions in Kosovo-Metohija *[TANJUG]* 56
Kosovo: World Trade Unionists Pledge Support for Workers *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 56
Kosovo: Serb Police Arrest Albanians in Kacanik, Other Villages *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 57
Kosovo: 10,000 Albanian Women Protest Serb Killing in Pristina *[Tirana TV]* 58

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Vojvodina Viewed as Model of Respect of Human Freedoms *[TANJUG]* 58

Balkans: Germany's Kinkel Opens Meeting of B-H Federation

LD2504110496 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 1006 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Free Democratic Party) opened a meeting between the partners of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation at the Petersberg [government guest house] near Bonn this morning. The Foreign Ministry said that the meeting is aimed at further stabilizing the federation as a central element of putting the Dayton Agreement into practice. The meeting was originally scheduled for 28 March, the anniversary of the founding of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, but had to be postponed because the partners were unable to reach agreement in the talks before talks.

Balkans: Tribunal Head Calls For Sanctions Against FRY

AU2504100696 Paris AFP in English 0944 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Strasbourg, April 25 (AFP)—The chairman of the UN war crimes tribunal called Thursday for the imposition of sanctions against Belgrade to punish its refusal to cooperate with the Bosnia war crimes probe.

Antonio Cassese, who heads The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, said the international community should reactivate sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro.

The tribunal has struggled to investigate allegations of atrocities committed during Bosnia's almost four-year war, notably in areas of the former Yugoslav republic controlled by Bosnian Serbs.

Belgrade has also been accused of sheltering war crimes suspects wanted by the tribunal for questioning into alleged massacres of Moslem civilians.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Albania: Berisha Said Running for Parliament To Secure Future

AU2404193296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 24 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Arian Cani: "Berisha Candidate for Democratic Party Deputy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sali Berisha is a candidate for deputy! This is an amazing and unexpected piece of news from the Democratic Party [PD] headquarters itself. The name of the president of the Republic is the first on the proportional representation list of candidates. The decision, so far confidential, has been confirmed by a reliable source within the inner presidium of the ruling party.

The PD officials call this decision normal, but in legal terms it is in total contravention of the package of constitutional laws. The final paragraph of Article 26 of the Constitutional Law states, "The post of president is irreconcilable with any other state office and with the chairmanship of a party." This article automatically puts the leader of the state in open contradiction with the Constitution of Albania. There were immediate and bitter retorts from the camp of the opposition parties. One lawyer-politician who remains deprived of the right to run as a candidate said, "This is another flagrant violation of the Constitutional Law by the president himself." [passage omitted]

Berisha Predicts His Own Move Into Opposition

It appears that the PD is carefully preparing for its first public setback in the 26 May elections, rather than a second victory. The recent decision by the president to run as a candidate in the proportional representation list is perhaps the clearest message that he is conveying to his party and to the Albanian electorate. The Albanian president's ambition to win a parliamentary seat again might be interpreted, "We might lose the elections, and so we must use every means to secure our future." Now that open political hatred has taken root between the governing party and the opposition, the head of state himself is obliged to take every step he can to secure his own future. [passage omitted]

Albania: Appeals Court Upholds Screening Commission Vetoes

AU2404192096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 24 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Mentor Kikia: "Files at the Court of Cassation: Politicians Fail"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Politicians labeled as unclean by the Screening Commission have now lost their final hope of entering the next parliament.

Yesterday morning the bench of judges chaired by Avni Shehu began to consider the appeals of the candidates rejected by the commission. The courtroom where the fate of the rejected deputies was decided held the candidates and the commission, with the judges between them. Socialist Party candidate Lato Lato was the first to appear before the judges and to receive a negative answer. He was followed by Prec Zogaj, Muhamet Bela, Perikli Teta, Afrim Hoti, Fatos Muco, Kristaq Tumani, Bajram Karaj, Fehmi Xhemo, Emin Mysliu, Rajmond Todhe, and Bashkim Maloku. One after another, the 13 on the first list emerged with downcast heads. A further 26 candidates of various parties will appear before the court before 26 April, when the deadline for considering appeals falls.

All the candidates made the same demand: Show us the compromising material. However, the judges did not agree, and confined themselves to a list noting the names of politicians who had links with the Sigurimi. Fatos Muco said, on emerging from the court: I asked to be informed about the material they had about me, but they did not have a single testimony or signature from me. The court rejected me only because of the entry of my name on a Sigurimi list for one year, without my knowledge, at the time when I was performing military service.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: Lilov Suggests Referendum on Joining NATO

AU2504104796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 25 Apr 96 p 17

[24 CHASA "staff report": "Lilov Advocates Referendum on NATO Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday in Vidin, Aleksandur Lilov declared that the issue of Bulgaria joining NATO should be decided by the people through a referendum, a[illegible] not by parliament.

The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] strategist said that the government's position, in wanting to know what NATO is offering and how Russia and the Balkans will be affected, is quite reasonable. In Lilov's view, the priority in the Left's [Democratic Left Parliamentary Group] foreign policy is our integration into the European structures, while friendship with Russia is a secondary issue.

Yeste[illegible]ay, the Left again rejected the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] proposal to adopt a decision regarding NATO.

Bulgaria: Politicians Said To Ignore Defense Industry

AU2404112196 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Apr 96 p 8

[Commentary by Boyan Rubin: "Defense Industry Is Still Waiting for Bold Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to certain information received, against the background of the events at the Arsenal plant in Kazanluk, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev is again seeking urgent solutions for the enterprises in the military-industrial complex that have become impoverished. However, whatever actions are taken, they are hardly likely to be more than halfhearted measures. The Bulgarian people call such initiatives "patching up": You put a patch on one side of a garment, and it then falls to pieces on the other side.

Nevertheless, at Arsenal the fates of 10,000 employees are at stake, a work force that provides a living for almost everyone in Kazanluk. Moreover, is Arsenal the only problem? According to estimates, the number of companies in the defense industry that are suffering problems is greater than even the keenest observer might discover from the first phase of the program to close down loss-making state companies. No one would have said, without risking the ridicule of all sensible Bulgarians, that the enterprises in the military-industrial complex were loss makers. No, they earned profits, and big ones at that! The problem is that in the transition to democracy and a market economy, no bold politicians can be found who are prepared to tell the West certain home truths. It is now clear to everyone that the conversion of the military industry can only be a gradual and carefully conducted process, ensuring the retention of important production facilities, the normalization of the industry, and its compliance with clear and universally accepted rules relating to the arms trade, while preserving transparency and general concern for all those affected. Otherwise the process will inevitably lead to collapse, producing severe social consequences. Last but not least, we find ourselves in a situation in which no one even mentions conversion, but only worries about his job and his daily bread. Alas, what use is patching up when the main thing is not done?

Bulgaria: Shipping Costs Delay Arrival of Russian Tanks

AU2404094796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Lyubomir Denov: "Delivery of Russian Tanks Delayed Because Shipping Charges Too High"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgarian shipping companies are demanding excessive fees for delivering the tanks and combat equipment that Russia has donated to us, it emerged yesterday.

This is the main reason why the weapons have remained so long beyond the Urals. Russia agreed to give us 100 tanks and 100 BMP-1 armored personnel carriers that were scheduled for destruction, but did not agree to pay for their shipment to Bulgaria.

A Bulgarian Defense Ministry source said that the ministry will probably prefer to engage a Russian shipping company who is offering lower prices. According to informed sources, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has issued instructions for a less expensive shipping company to be found. Apart from this, he wants to personally hand over the first combat vehicles to his Bulgarian counterpart in Sofia. Grachev has been invited to attend the opening of the Bulgarian arms exhibition on 27 May. It is quite possible that a giant "Ruslan" transport aircraft may touch down in Sofia the day before this [occurs] with T-72's and BMP-1's on board.

Bulgaria: Pirinski on Postponement of Trip to Skopje

AU2404151896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Germany is prepared to analyze with us the possibilities of taking Bulgaria's name off

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the Schengen list, and adopt, together with Bulgaria, specific steps in this direction, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski said upon his return from Bonn.

According to the first Bulgarian diplomat, German counterpart Klaus Kinkel understands well the Bulgarian position and in principle supports Bulgaria's desire to be taken off this list.

Minister Pirinski expressed puzzlement over certain commentaries in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] press regarding his postponed visit to Macedonia, and said that this was supposed to be an unofficial working meeting, which could be more beneficial when it is better prepared. According to Mr. Pirinski, postponing the visit creates possibilities for unblocking the signing of several bilateral agreements.

Georgi Pirinski said to the journalists that Germany is viewing the upcoming meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers in Sofia with serious interest and expectations.

As far as the upcoming visit to Bulgaria of NATO Secretary General Solana, the Bulgarian foreign minister thinks that protocol reasons should not be used for the creation of an unsuitable atmosphere around this visit. The Bulgarian Government expects the visit to produce a serious rather than a politicized discussion regarding the issue of NATO eastward expansion.

Bulgaria: Postponement of Pirinski's Skopje Visit Viewed

AU2404121296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Apr 96 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia, Skopje—Relations between Sofia and Skopje have become tense because of the postponement of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski's visit to Skopje, AFP reported yesterday.

It was announced in Skopje that the visit scheduled for 24-25 April "had been postponed at the initiative of the Bulgarian side." The government newspaper NOVA MAKEDONIJA quotes Strakhil Chervenkov, head of the Southeastern Europe Department at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, as saying that the visit had been postponed due to the increasing anti-Bulgarian campaign being mounted in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] media, which does not create a good atmosphere. Pirinski himself said on 22 April that "such a visit was discussed, but evidently it will take place at a later date; we have to choose a more suitable moment."

The Macedonian Embassy in Sofia said that Ambassador Georgi Spasov was out of Bulgaria to give his views on the situation that has developed and expressed regret at the postponement of the visit. However, in a correspondent's report from Sofia, NOVA MAKEDONIJA quotes Ambassador Spasov as saying that the reason lies in the statement that Macedonian Foreign Ministry Ljubomir Frckovski made recently in Helsinki. He stated that Macedonia continues to insist that the treaties with Bulgaria are signed in the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages according to the two countries' Consututions, but Sofia does not agree. In September last year, Pirinski said that "Bulgaria will propose that the bilateral agreements are signed in the official language of each of the two countries and, if necessary, Macedonia may declare what it understands to be its official language under its Constitution." As a result of this dispute, 23 agreements that have already been prepared are blocked.

Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, declared yesterday that the language dispute is a secondary issue, and in this dispute the Bulgarian side was being influenced by forces that do not want Bulgarian-Macedonian relations to improve.

On 22 April, the Macedonian media again mounted a campaign about a "Bulgarian trail" in the attempt on the life of President Kiro Gligorov last October. The death of Ivo Yanchev, Multigroup's representative in Skopje, who was found hanged in Bistrica last week, also prompted similar insinuations. Informed sources told KONTINENT, however, that it is very likely that Yanchev committed suicide because he had misappropriated large sums of money as a result of his passion for gambling.

Bulgaria: Talks With Romania on Nuclear Safety Held

AU2404170296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian-Romanian talks on the draft of an intergovernmental agreement on operational exchange of information in case of a nuclear accident, as well as on exchanging information on nuclear equipment, have ended. The leaders of the two delegations, Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee on Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, and Anton Dragomirescu, chairman of the Romanian National Commission on Nuclear Activity Control, signed a memorandum on the talks.

The draft agreement will be submitted to the two countries' governments.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Daily on U.S. Bill on NATO, Slovakia

AU2404172096 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 22 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Peter Schutz: "Slovakia Is the Odd Man Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Foreign Committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress is finishing the preparation of the bill on NATO expansion. According to this bill, only the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are to participate in the first wave of expansion. This means without Slovakia, where the internal situation, as Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman told LIDOVE NOVINY, "evokes the feeling in Congress that the present government is more concerned with holding onto power than implementing democratic reforms."

It is not even that important whether this bill will be adopted with the submitted wording or, for that matter, whether it will be adopted at all. It is more of a declaration; the significance is in the very proposal, in the recommendation. Although the word of the United States undoubtedly weighs the most in the alliance, it does not make the decision. The European members have their own ideas about expansion, and in the instances of France and Great Britain, they substantially differ from the U.S. ideas (particularly regarding the timing). However, the Republican initiative bears a significant, new aspect: If the draft submitted to the Congress is not changed, the model V3-plus-1 instead of the previous V4 will have its "expression on paper" for the first time ever—the previous verbal warnings addressed to Bratislava, both behind the scenes and publicly, and the demarches, which in fact were a warning finger, a threat. The bill means a "qualitative" shift: A simple threat is transformed into the first step toward its implementation.

To say that Meciar must lie in the bed he made would be appropriate but not very original. What remains in the background, however, of the certainly passionate improvisations on this topic and probably will remain unnoticed is one emerging question mark: Has the time really come to name the countries that "will enter into the alliance first," as Senator Gilman believes in the interview for LIDOVE NOVINY? Namely, this also leads to a terrifying side effect in Slovakia—the encouragement and reinforcement of isolationist and "Europhobic" trends. Slovakia in its present form simply does not belong in NATO or the EU. It is not written anywhere, however, although it is more likely than not that the situation would not be different perhaps even after the 1998 elections. It is a fact that precisely each symbolic and signaling "no" has the potential to start processes that would change the unpleasant prospects into a definite reality.

Czech Republic: IFOR Soldiers Criticize Army Equipment

AU2404171796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Apr 96 p 8

[CTK report: "IFOR Soldiers Criticize Their Equipment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Arapusa—The soldiers of the Czech battalion of the IFOR [Impiementation Force] peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, who are carrying out demanding assignments here connected with maintaining the truce, clearing mines, and distributing humanitarian aid, are having problems with their equipment and special hardware. Moreover, at present, they must also clear away carcasses of dead animals because, as the temperature rises, the risk of contamination of the soil and water grows, with a subsequent spread of infection.

"It seems that none of the development staff expected the troops to move about on foot and see to their tasks in wet and freezing conditions," Captain Petr Miller, commander of the 2d Mechanized Company, said at the Arapusa base in Bosnia. All the men complain, above all, about their boots, flak jackets, sleeping bags, and knapsacks.

Despite the commanders' repeated letters to their superiors pointing out these shortcomings after experiences from Army exercises abroad and the preceding UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mission, no improvement has occurred.

"The military boots are too heavy, allow the feet to freeze, and are not waterproof. Unlike the equipment of other armies, they are made in only one type that does not suit every foot: The toe is too narrow and some soldiers cannot fit the boot around their shins," Miller summed up. The flak jackets are, according to him, too heavy, and during walks they rub the shoulders and groin raw, the velcro fasteners keep coming undone, and the pockets are too small for magazines. The summer fatigues are, according to the commander, functional only by their mimicry print: If a soldier is caught in the rain, they take up to two days to dry on him. The knapsacks tear easily, and the sleeping bags, which are effective only above 0 degrees Celsius, are heavy and cannot be efficiently packed.

"No one paid much regard to the standards we proposed before our departure," Miller stated. "Although an employee of the Vyskov Military Research Institute

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

was sent to the Rapid Reaction Brigade because of the introduction of new equipment, he complained that he could not travel abroad to check the equipment of other armies," the commander stated. "We pointed out to him that he did not need to go anywhere because many soldiers came to us for exercises. Specifically, international seminars have been taking place in Cesky Krumlov since 1993. So, if they really wanted to, they could have established contacts a long time ago. The Slovenes, whom we met at exercises in the United States last year, have learned their lesson and now they use it," Capt. Miller pointed out.

The explosives experts also have problems with equipment and proper training. Although they have been carefully preparing for Bosnia, here they are facing mines of types completely unknown to them. Of the 90 trained sappers, only eight are able to work on mine clearance. Moreover, while the Slovaks have eight special tanks at their disposal for clearing mines, the Czechs, according to sapper Captain Miroslav Vodehnal, are waiting in vain for the Bozena mine detector.

"The mines are mostly Yugoslav-made and are often booby-trapped in a nasty way. Grenades with the pin pulled out are placed under the pins of antipersonnel mines," Vodehnal says. Some of them have a tremendous destructive effect up to a distance of 100 meters. Mines, activated from bunkers, are capable of eliminating entire military units. Almost 1,500 antipersonnel mines have been cleared from 54 minefields in the area of Otoka, Rudica, and Arapusa. According to the submitted reports, however, many mines have disappeared. Some were carried off by the river during floods and now threaten fishermen and children. The sappers estimate that complete mine clearance will take between 20 and 50 years.

Czech Republic: Holan Admits 'Resistance' to GS Changes

AU2404161196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Apr 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Holan Has Admitted That Part of the General Staff Rejects Changes in the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party) claims that reducing the size of the Army and cutting its operational costs have come up against resistance in recent years from some of the senior officers in the General Staff [GS].

So, in summing up the four-year period in which the People's Party has been in charge of the Defense Ministry, Holan has admitted for the first time that incompatible views have prevailed throughout this period between the Defense Ministry and part of the GS on the speed and extent of the Army's transformation into a small but effective force.

Holan described GS Chief Jiri Nekvasil as one of the shining exceptions, without whom not even the basic transformation changes would have taken place in the Army. "His part in the changes made is huge," stated the minister. Some senior officers, who do not wish to give their names out of concern about causing trouble, have claimed, however, that Nekvasil was isolated in his endeavor to bring the Army closer to NATO standards.

Holan refused to reveal the names of the officers who rejected radical changes in the Army. "The majority of them have already reached retirement age and will soon leave the Army," he said. The rest, according to the minister, will have to reconcile themselves to the new system of command and economic management. "These are mostly people who, in the past, were used to great power that, at the same time, was unsupervised by anyone. Therefore, they have done everything possible to ensure that no one knew what they were up to," declared Holan.

The minister's economic deputy, Miroslav Kalousek, considers the resistance to reducing the size of the Army, to cutting its operational costs, and especially to the accounting rules to be a natural reaction by the senior officers. "I do not see anything unusual in this," said Kalousek. At the same time, he is convinced that the Army and the Interior and Transportation Ministries are among the most conservative institutions that, everywhere in the world, resist any kind of change.

"It is important that we have come out on top in the struggle to make our forces more transparent and smaller. Transformation has gone so far that it cannot be reversed," thinks the minister.

Many officers, however, are critical of the minister's lack of resolve to get rid in time of the people who are slowing down the Army's transformation. At the same time, they maintain that, if Holan had found the courage to get rid of these people, the Army would obviously be considerably further ahead.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Government Said To Veto Hungarian as OSCE Head

AU2404153596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Apr 96 pp 1, 19

[Article by Ivan Drabek: "According to Istvan Gyarmati, the Slovak Republic Blocked His Election To Head the OSCE Only Because He Is a Hungarian"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Istvan Gyarmati, a leading Hungarian diplomat, withdrew his candidacy for the post of secretary general of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because of Slovakia's disagreement with his nomination. In a telephone interview for PRAVDA, Gyarmati confirmed this information, which had been reported by the daily NEPSZ-ABADSAG yesterday.

"I am disappointed that the Slovak Government incomprehensibly refused to support the promising candidacy of a representative of our Central European region. I believe that it was inappropriate for the Slovak side to draw into this issue problems that still remain in the otherwise relatively settled relations between our countries," said Istvan Gyarmati (46), who was the chief organizer of the Budapest CSCE-OSCE summit of December 1994 and OSCE executive secretary at the time of the Hungarian presidency of this organization.

The term of office of the incumbent OSCE secretary general, Wilhelm Hoynick, expires in mid-June. Until then, the more than 50 member countries ought to find consensus regarding his successor. Following the withdrawal of Istvan Gyarmati, whose candidacy, according to Hungarian sources, was supported also by EU member countries, this position is now being sought by the Polish diplomat Jerzy Nowak and the Slovak Jan Kubis, director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center.

Gyarmati voiced the conviction that the Slovak side refused to accept his candidacy only because he is citizen of the Hungarian Republic. Asked whether the Slovak objections to his candidacy could not be the settling of old scores for possible personal conflicts with Slovak diplomats at the time when he was OSCE executive secretary, Gyarmati stressed that although he occasionally had some working exchanges of opinion with the Slovak delegation, like with any other delegation, the relations were always correct. "The only relatively lively discussion that we had was when Slovak colleagues asked that their minister be given floor earlier than foreseen in the schedule, a request I was unable to meet for procedural reasons."

Emil Kuchar, general director of the Political Section at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed to PRAVDA yesterday Slovak diplomacy's objections to Istvan Gyarmati's nomination, but he categorically rejected the notion that these objections could be related in any way to his nationality. He stressed that Slovakia did not intend to give up its right, stemming from its OSCE membership, to present its opinion on any issue under discussion and that it had no reason not to participate in the process of nominating and electing its individual office holders. "In this context we clearly stated, as early as at the September 1995 meeting of the OSCE Standing Council in Prague, that we ascribe such importance to the election of the OSCE secretary general that we are prepared to put forward our own candidate," Emil Kuchar said.

Kuchar sees Gyarmati's statement that the Slovak Republic had blocked his candidacy only because he is a Hungarian national as a confirmation of all the fears harbored by the Slovak side, which are based on findings and experience with the activity of Ambassador Gyarmati, whose professional qualities as a foremost expert in the sphere of security policy the Slovak side never questioned. "We have never spoken about him as a Hungarian citizen, but we believe that the secretary general ought to have not only political and national qualities, but should also enjoy the confidence of all members of the organization," Emil Kuchar said.

Slovakia: 'Cold War' Between Government, Bishops Viewed

AU2404165896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24 Apr 96 p 9

[Commentary by Julius Gembicky: "Signs of Cold War Between Government and Bishops' Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first dispute between Vladimir Meciar's third government and the Slovak Bishops' Conference (KBS) has stirred up public opinion after last year's KBS vote that it does not favor immediate steps leading to the establishment of a Catholic university. Because of this generous gesture, the prime minister, who had already returned to the churches their property [confiscated by the communist regime], wanted to improve his image during the pope's visit and tip the scales in the contest with the president in his favor. After the holy father's visit, Dominik Hrusovsky, suffragan bishop of the Bratislava-Trnava diocese, resigned as KBS secretary general.

The second wound inflicted upon the prime minister by the KBS, precisely because of his intransigence in relation to the head of state, was its statement of May 1995, in which this legal body of the church took the president's side and called on Prime Minister Meciar to pursue a policy of reconciliation toward not only the president, but the opposition as well. It is more than

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

characteristic that, following this public presentation of the KBS's stance, the police searched the residence of diocesan bishop Rudolf Balaz in conjunction with the sale of the triptych Adoration of the Magi. Based on the testimony by former member of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] Oskar F., the suspicion has not been eradicated that, just as in the abduction of the president's son to Austria, the SIS also had its fingers in the accusation, raised against the Banska Bystrica bishopric, of the illegal sale of the painting.

A further deterioration in relations between the state administration and some high-ranking representatives of the church hierarchy was caused by threatening telephone calls to Deacon Bala: following his radio sermon in which he warned against the consequences of the confrontation of power instigated by the government coalition. And the last straw in the increasingly strained relations was the KBS's critical statement prior to the approval of the Penal Code amendment in the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

As neither the statement in support of the president nor the statement on the Penal Code amendment featured the signatures of all the KBS members, government circles were insinuating at rallies and in the progovernment media that high-ranking church dignitaries were divided into pro-Slovak and nationally lukewarm ones. Since, in both instances, the KBS was more or less assuming a position on political issues and not on questions of faith and ethics, it was not the obligation of all the KBS members to agree on and to sign the statements, as was the case of the statement on the establishment of the Catholic university. Not only Cardinal Jan Chryzostom Korec, but also Archbishop Jan Sokol and suffragan bishops Frantisek Rabek and Dominik Hrusovsky made use of this right to issue statements of their own.

Some foreign and also progovernment circles are establishing a direct connection between the appointment of Dominik Hrusovsky as archbishop and papal nuncio in Minsk and the summoning of Anton Neuwirth, Slovak ambassador to the Vatican, to Bratislava for consultations. Some observers are expressing the indirect suspicion that, during their visits to the Holy See, Bishop Rudolf Balaz or Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Jan Carnogursky were engaged in activities, through Ambassador Anton Neuwirth, aimed at Dominik Hrusovsky being assigned a diplomatic post.

It would be a disservice to Slovakia if our diplomacy brought pressure to bear on the Vatican, by recalling Anton Neuwirth, for example. This would not only damage bilateral relations, which are successful also thanks to Ambassador Neuwirth, but the attitude of the church in Slovakia to Vladimir Meciar's government would become even frostier.

Slovakia: SDL's Fogas Denies 'Love Affair' With HZDS

AU2404093896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Apr 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Lubomir Fogas, candidate for SDL chairman at the coming SDL Congress in Nitra on 27-28 April, by Anna Lenicka; place and date not given: "Love Affairs Are Absurd Fiction"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lenicka] Is it wise tactics to go into a duel for the highest party post, given the fact that you lost this duel only a year ago?

[Fogas] I contemplated for a long time whether to comply with the wishes of a number of district representatives and party members who had asked me to run. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has given me a great deal. It allowed me to get to know many good and wise people, to forge new friendships, to see and get to know a great deal here and abroad. The SDL is in distress and I want to try to help it.

[Lenicka] In each democratic party—and, fortunately, the SDL is still such a party—a contest of political concepts and personalities takes place. However, none of the six candidates for the chairman's post has come up with his own alternative. This is all the more surprising as there is permanent talk about different directions within the SDL....

[Fogas] For a long time, the public has been fed with the artificial notion that the SDL is divided over certain directions and programs. I have been claiming from the beginning that this is not the case and none of my friends has ever admitted this either. It is necessary to analyze in retrospect statements made by SDL leaders and reply to the question—who is dividing the SDL?

[Lenicka] Who?

[Fogas] The view has appeared in the press that the SDL is divided into some kind of a transformation sociodemocratic wing and into a wing that wants to return before Presov [venue of a Communist Party of Slovakia congress that decided on the party's transformation into the SDL]. This view was presented also by the SDL chairman [Peter Weiss] in his speech to the Third Republican Board Meeting. There have also been reports about the party being divided into those who want to privatize and those who want to stay out of this process. The membership base did not accept any of these theses. In NOVE SLOVO [left-wing weekly] the SDL chairman divides the party into a left and a right wing, which he

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

backs by the presentation of interests or, more precisely, by who wants to represent which interest group [sentence as published]. I believe that even such a division is out of the question.

[Lenicka] Why do you think so?

[Fogas] Because it has become apparent that we do not really differ in substance when it comes to the definition of the defense of interests. The authors of the action program, which is the work of specialists from among SDL political practitioners, and the authors of the political program, which was prepared by a team of political scientists, sociologists, and so forth, concurred in this.... Both programs gained clear support in the internal party debate. Therefore, the orientation of its program is not the main problem for the SDL. At long last, and I would like to stress this, the SDL will have its own internal party program for revitalizing party activity and an action program, which should become some kind of a backbone of our party structures' future work.

[Lenicka] Okay. Let us concede that the SDL did not waste time in unproductive discussions. But even that does not explain why it was necessary to convene the congress one year ahead of schedule.

[Fogas] This decision was actually embedded in the ideas of the delegates after the Poprad congress. Many of them left disappointed. Not because of the election results, but, above all, because the party did not clearly declare its program for the subsequent period. This is also borne out by the analysis of statements by delegates to the Third Congress, which was discussed in the SDL Republican Board as an official document. It is clearly stated in this analysis that the absence of the possibility to identify the SDL's political direction is the prevalent feeling in the party, because it cannot be distinguished from that of other political entities. Also the analysis of replies to a letter sounding out what party members expect of SDL's policy showed, among other things, that the SDL has been unable to more clearly pinpoint basic problems in education, health care, the social sphere, or the housing policy and to enforce control over privatization. Naturally, some of this has objective causes, but there is no doubt that some of the causes are also subjective. The SDL has not become a unifying force for left-leaning currents and it has also been unable more actively to proclaim its relationship with workers and farmers. Therefore, the congress is not the result of the decision by a narrow group of people, but of the party's ineffective work.

[Lenicka] At the congress in Poprad, some delegates were voting for you in the hope that you would be able to tone down the confrontational relations with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and prevent the decimation [decimacia] of your people. In the meantime, however, this possibility has all but vanished and you are now stuck with the image of a politician capable of coming to an agreement with the government coalition, to which an internal party referendum gave a negative reply....

[Fogas] The reply given by the internal party referendum is clear and comprehensible and I think that, in view of the increasingly unacceptable coalition steps, it could not be any different.... It is necessary to ask two questions, however. The first is: When was the SDL successful in its policy? When it was in opposition, but in a constructive one and did not mechanically reject everything but, on the contrary, participated in the positive shaping of ideas about the functioning of our society. When we were able to communicate in a businesslike manner with all political forces. When, under Vladimir Meciar's second government, Peter Weiss was first deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, we were able to work in groups, in which our experts, during the drafting of laws, were able to enforce the interests of SDL voters and assert our program bit by bit or prevent things that were unacceptable to us.

Second, what is the raison d'etre of a political party, in fact? To assert the interests of people, voters and sympathizers who had given it their votes. What kind of a party is it that has hundreds of experts but whose views it is not able to assert anywhere? What kind of a party is it that is not able to push through its own people at a time when the state is in a complicated situation because of shortage of expert cadres? What kind of a party is it that is not even able to defend the interests of its members? The supreme attribute of left-wing policy is, simply speaking, taking care of the people! This is why I said, as early as spring 1994, that Slovakia can be helped only by politicians who are able to come to an agreement.

[Lenicka] But power is in the hands of those who are building "Chinese walls." Moreover, even agreements must respect certain boundaries....

[Fogas] I do not think that I was one of those who retreated even on a single issue of principle. I will call attention to my duel with Vladimir Meciar when the Constitution was being assessed.... [passage omitted] Where were those who claim today that I am very soft and able to back down? And that was not my only discussion and my only very open disagreement with representatives of the government, be it under Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky or under Mr. Meciar.... For a long time, a myth has been cultivated about some SDL leaders, as though we were traitors. It is being cultivated

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

by the very people who eagerly accepted the first offers that the SDL received.

[Lenicka] Is the SDL not facing the threat of split?

[Fogas] I reject the thesis that there is life-and-death strife within the SDL, that it is about to break up. It is necessary to differentiate between two planes of the discussions—the pragmatic plane, about how the party ought to proceed, where a certain tension in relations is natural, and various misguided discussions or insinuations such as: who will guarantee that the love affair of some of us with Tomasikova street [HZDS headquarters] will not recur?

[Lenicka] Will it not?

[Fogas] There is nothing that could recur! It is unfair when a member of our party insinuates ideas or events that never happened. I do not know anything about any SDL functionaries ever visiting Tomasikova street since the last elections, so that any love affairs are an absurd fiction that deludes the public....

[Lenicka] In case of your failure at the congress, to which endeavor will you open your ears—the more radical one, subscribed to by individuals in the SDL top leadership, that the opposition must be driven out of the party, or the more moderate one, recommending to the unsuccessful ones that they devote themselves exclusively to their specialization and to their work as deputies?

[Fogas] I consider the notion that it is correct to drive anyone out of the party to be a hazardous game with the opinion of the membership base, but also those who stood at its cradle. The SDL has already lost too many people, due to its own mistakes. It is responsible for the situation that came about after the elections because it had itself been pushing for early elections, in which it failed because of its own mistakes. I consider any losses in personnel to be a severe wound for the SDL and its future, which I see, first and foremost, in young people, of whose needs we must be able to take much better care. Likewise, we must take much better care of the bastions of our policy. We have these bastions in mayors and deputies, to whom we must offer programs of economic liberation. I am prepared to bear responsibility for such steps.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Defense Committee Comments on Army Reform

LD2404204596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the National Assembly's Defense Committee, the implementation of the armed forces reform requires modification because, according to the opposition, the present ideas can lead the Army to a crisis. The body heard Defense Ministry and Hungarian Army leaders and took the position that the transformation should not be continued without a thorough examination of its likely effects.

It was said at the committee's session that 700 professional soldiers had left the Army since last summer and most of them had been excellent experts.

Hungary: 'Expert' Discusses NATO Membership Issues

AU2404122596 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 24 Apr 96 pp 1, 9

[Unattributed report: "Should Countries That Remain Outside NATO Be Afraid of Their Neighbors?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are regarded as having the best chances in the struggle for NATO membership. This is a rather tough game in which one has no consideration for the problems of the other one, the Prague political weekly RESPEKT points out. According to RESPEKT, among the three countries, Hungary is in the most difficult situation because of its unsettled relations with Slovakia and particularly with Romania. What can we expect if Hungary is accepted into NATO before some of its neighbors?

Romanian Defense Minister Tinca said recently that this would lead to a regional arms race. The Hungarian foreign minister, however, stressed that Hungary is interested in seeing as many neighbors as possible join NATO, but Hungary is not willing to wait for other countries in this integration process.

The issue of countries that do not make it in the first round also appears in the debate document presented to NATO officials in Brussels by Hungarian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi. In this document, the Hungarian diplomacy informs NATO of the Hungarian intentions and the steps made so far, and it also formulates questions in connection with future membership.

In answering our questions, Ferenc Somogyi stressed that we are still at the beginning of the process and the current consultations are not yet concrete negotiations on NATO membership. Therefore, for the time being, the Hungarian side starts from the premise that no decision has yet been made on which countries will be accepted in the first round and which countries will remain outside. Thus, the Hungarian position can only be formulated in general for NATO: Special attention will have to be attributed to the circle of countries that do not become NATO members after the first round, so that NATO expansion does not become a separating line between individual countries in the region.

Hungary is interested in seeing its neighbors fulfill the integration requirements and thus become members of integration institutions. According to Somogyi, integration means the expansion of the stability region, so this cannot be regarded as a destabilizing factor by any country's viewpoint. Of course, Somogyi does not question the fact that the feeling of security is an important factor. Efforts must be made to make sure that the countries remaining outside have no real basis for feeling abandoned, Somogyi added.

This is how the diplomat sees things. However, this issue also has military considerations. We asked security policy expert Peter Deak to talk about these aspects. According to Deak, the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE] complicates things. The CFE was born before the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, and it determines internally divided contingents for NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Deak says the CFE in itself has become slightly anachronistic today because the Warsaw Pact disintegrated into Soviet successor states and the other former Warsaw Pact countries. If NATO restructures itself, the aforementioned contingent figures will obviously have to be set anew in accordance with the European balance of forces, and NATO will not give up this demand. Therefore, an arms race cannot start by itself because the Helsinki process continues to live.

According to Peter Deak, possible NATO membership will not necessarily upset the power relations between the given country and its neighbors; moreover, it is possible that this membership will change the power relations to the benefit of the other country, the one that remains outside NATO. NATO does not necessarily express security guarantees in the size of troops deployed on the territory of a given country. If, say, Poland joins NATO, this does not necessarily mean that its armed forces will be bigger; on the contrary, its armed forces might even become smaller. Perhaps this is how NATO will want to demonstrate that it will not deploy a large number of troops in border zones.

Joining NATO also means some sort of an armed forces modernization, Peter Deak pointed out, and added that modernization in itself is always a certain arms race

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

at the same time. However, this is totally independent of NATO. Every country tries to develop its own military power. As to how strong this rivalry can become depends on whether there is any security risk among the given countries, one that requires great care. For example, there is no lack of confidence between Norway and Finland, so the fact that both countries are developing their own army does not present any problems. However, the situation is different between Greece and Turkey.

According to Peter Deak, in the course of negotiations on joining NATO, the Hungarian foreign policy will have to adequately deal with these tensions and will have to convince the countries with which NATO is not conducting acceptance talks that these negotiations are not directed against them. A multitude of confidence treaties will have to be signed. It will not depend on us whether all this leads to an arms race. The Hungarian negotiating position will probably be that we should spend as little as possible on arms, Peter Deak pointed out.

Hungary: Article Views New Economic 'Superpolice'

AU2304081596 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 16 Apr 96 pp 12-14

[Article by Laszlo Bartus: "Clean Hands in Pockets—Searching for the Trace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Sharp-featured men with springy steps will soon be walking about in the rooms of the Prime Minister's Office [MEH], carrying heavy documents. They will be investigators, members of an economic investigating office (the Hungarian FBI) that is being organized within the MEH. According to the prime minister's intention, it will fight black economy, large-scale corruption, and privatization fraud. And the policemen will obviously stand on duty in the streets with little red signs in their hands and flag down unruly Trabant car drivers.... The new organization is surrounded by much debate. Many people question the validity of the political intent; and many believe the police force is not a worm that, when cut in two, can continue to live in two pieces. Laszlo Bartus's article was written in the wake of the debate.*

In the view of respectable Socialist politicians, Hungary can regain its leading role in East European by setting up the economic investigating authority. The "Hungarian FBI," which is being organized, will solve our existing problems by clearing up economic crimes. On the other hand, other comrades believe that Hungary is more likely to get into the focus of the democratically sensitive and educated world's attention through a special (Hungarian model) transformation of state administration.

A special legal situation is emerging: Gyula Horn will soon have two governments. We know the official one, and the other is being formed within the MEH. According to some people, it will be necessary to set up the parallel government because the professional supervision of the various ministries, the transparency of state administration, and interest coordination in public "limit the prime minister in making quick and well-founded decisions." The series of "technical" type reorganizations have so far affected the SZDSZ-led ministries. One after the other, the competencies are being shifted from the "liberal ministries" to the MEH, which is growing into a top political ministry.

Who Guards the Guards?

The economic investigating authority will come directly under the prime minister and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], Laszlo Kover, deputy chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, explains. As no rational justification exists for setting up this organization, we can only think that, under the title "economic," they want to create a new secret service, a political police serving special party interests.

According to the news, the socialist FBI would be an organization with special licenses. Some people even compare this new structure to the "Untouchables" who pursued the Chicago mafia.

In Hungary, this resembles the model of the former State Security Department, rather than the Chicago "Untouchables," Peter Hack, chairman of the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, says. Even in this case, the question is: Who will guard the guards? No kind of investigating authority, which is allowed to employ secret service tools, can be set up until one has clarified to whom the citizens can turn if their rights are violated by this organization. According to our experience, central investigating offices without control tend to "cut loose" after a while and abuse their position.

Istvan Szikinger, senior member at the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI), said this is especially easy because even the unlawful commands—except for crimes—have to be executed at the organizations in charge of maintaining public order. "The magic term 'no legal violation has occurred' can easily emerge because legal violation can occasionally be a legally prescribed obligation at the secret services. This is very dangerous from a human-rights points of view."

According to Szikinger, we must also take into consideration the possibility that the current government can

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

be replaced by a populist and autocratic cabinet. In this case, a dictatorship can be set up in a seemingly constitutional framework. According to the opposition, this is what the Socialists are already doing. However, SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto told 168 ORA that, rather than a concentration of power, this is a case of "regrouping the government's tasks."

The Socialists defend Horn's proposal: "The idea itself is good." Deputy parliamentary group leader Laszlo Toller justifies the need for a centralized superpolice with professional deficiencies.

"This is where we are. The current institutions are unable to solve the problem."

Hearing this, the policemen take some deep breaths and remain silent—officially. Otherwise they say that, rather than a superpolice, what is needed is a properly equipped and paid constitutional police to which important people cannot suggest which criminal is a "protected species" and which is not. According to those with experience, nothing has changed in this area since the change of the regime. The same thing happened in the past as is happening now: Certain people can be investigated, others cannot. On this subject, Ferenc Koszeg wrote in NEPSZAVA that "privately and confidentially, police leaders recall the names of well-known government-side politicians against whom, as it were, criminal proceedings could be started immediately."

This paper, 168 ORA, has concrete information on the fact that, due to intervention by the MSZP's leading circles, police action is being delayed against a Socialist deputy publicly known as the Pink Panther who is accused of economic crimes. The situation is contradictory: While Party Chairman-Prime Minister Gyula Horn publicly declares war on corruption and the black economy and indirectly declares the SZDSZ-led Interior Ministry incapable of performing these tasks, the Interior Ministry is forced to put a lot of effort into making it possible to apply the penal Code's paragraphs against people protected by the MSZP. Not so long ago, Peto's direct intervention and coalition bargaining was needed for the Socialist parliamentary group to vote for the suspension of deputy Zoltan Haller's (the Pink Panther) immunity.

"Cool It, Gyula!"

The Hungarian "clean hands" action is also brought into question by our information from a confidential source, according to which, after the change of government, Peter Boross warned Horn "not to be hot with the clearing up campaign" because they might also "dig up some facts" in this case. We do not know if this is true. At any rate, the promised anticorruption war did not happen. According to certain police officers, it is difficult to investigate economic crimes because the economy and politics are strongly interconnected. Many of the white-collar criminals are "untouchable." According to expert opinions, in Hungary, parties keep each other in check by not revealing each other's "dirty businesses," rather than by not allowing these to exist. After all, it is not by accident that the parliamentary deputies did not manage to create a law on their conflict of interest issues in six years.

For this reason, many people believe that, rather than to investigate economic crimes in an unbiased way, the economic investigation authority is to be set up to protect certain economic (-political) interest groups and to expose others. Kover, as he says, does not wish to enter into speculation. However, in connection with the idea of the economic investigation office, he would be very interested in "what kind of traces of economic crimes the police have found and how comfortable the prime minister feels regarding the fate of these." According to the plan, the new organization can take over police cases that are in progress as it pleases, and their outcome will not then be made public.

Chapel of Quiet Arrangements

From this point of view, a remark by a supercop of one of the affected police organizations is noteworthy; all he said about the whole issue is that "the stronger dog does the f...ing [as published]." Others state clearly that the investigating authority's task will be to cover up some cases and exaggerate others. A 100-member organization cannot be expected to do more than this.

Whether it is true or it is not, after such an unfortunate step, no one would be able to wash off the suspicion that the goal is to give preference to concrete economic interests and to repress others, Szikinger claims. According to Hack, before the investigating authority, an entrepreneur can become suspicious even if he just makes contact with certain parties, while the illegal affairs of others can be "settled" without proceedings, unless this organization's independent court supervision is established.

The indications are not too encouraging. Since youth policy and church affairs were transferred to the MEH, the prime minister has lifted these issues out of the usual democratic—but cumbersome—process of administration. He can dish out hundreds of billions of forints without any coordination. And the Leftist Youth Association is increasingly "taking youth policy into social ownership," namely it can pilfer the assets of the youth fund. The MEH has been turned into a "chapel for quiet lobbying" and background negotiations. According to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Kover, it is simply life-threatening to install a secret service in this organization.

The more directly an investigating authority comes under a politician, the easier it is to give orders without any trace, Hack says. In the previous cycle, the national security committee investigating the operation of secret services struggled precisely with the problem that the services' men did not only observe people on the basis of written orders.

It turned out that they observed politicians and candidates for Parliament on verbal orders, Hack says.

The economic investigating authority is not an independent professional organization; according to Horn's plan, it would be supervised by a minister without portfolio (a politician). According to our information, the prime minister's candidate is none other than Tamas Suchman, the privatization minister who recently withdrew his resignation from the party in stormy circumstances, whose companies to be privatized will run out in around 1997, and who would then become an unemployed minister without portfolio in the government. (Let us not even think that the investigating authority was invented to create a new job for Suchman). However, while privatizations are still in progress, there will be some overlap. The unique specialty of the Hungarian "clean hands" campaign will be the fact that the investigating authority that is to investigate privatization fraud will be supervised by the minister responsible for privatization. This could be a strange meeting of "robbers" and "cops" under the protective wings of the minister.... A further peculiarity of the issue is that, according to our information, Suchman does not agree with the idea of setting up the economic investigating authority. The question is of when he was informed about the prime minister's personnel ideas and to what extent they will influence his purely professional opinion. Observers are somewhat worried about whether it will be possible to negotiate with Suchman, the chief investigator, in the same way as it is possible to negotiate with Suchman, the chief privatization man.

Legal Rearrangement?

According to Szikinger, the plan to set up the economic investigating authority does not clash with the Constitution, but it requires a major legal rearrangement.

At the Economic Coordination Secretariat set up in the MEH in 1995 to suppress the black economy, international examples are quoted to prove that an investigating authority subordinated to the prime minister is not unique.

To my knowledge, this type of organization is only operating in Singapore, Szikinger says.

According to Hack, central investigating authorities are only set up in places where no central state police exists.

Hungary does have a state police. There is no point in creating an "even more central" police. As it is impossible to train economic investigators overnight and much experience is needed for this work, the new organization would weaken the existing ones. In this respect, it is not negligible that the first year's budget for the new investigating authority would be 600 million forints while the economic police of the National Police Headquarters has never received more than 90 million forints a year. And the Pest County Customs Office, which is investigating the rather complicated Kordax case, does not even have a computer....

[Interior Minister] Gabor Kuncze says that he is not at all happy about this plan. Before Parliament and the public, he continues to be responsible for public law and order and for pursuing crime.

At the same time, the Hungarian FBI (and its inventor) can delight in the cases "it finds pleasing."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Bildt Urges 'Fair Access' to Media for Parties, Candidates

AU2404185396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the Administrative Commission of the Council for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Sarajevo was held in the city today. The meeting was chaired by EU High Commissioner Carl Bildt, and attended by Ambassador Robert Frowick, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission head and president of the Temporary Electoral Commission.

The statement, presented by Bildt at today's press conference in Sarajevo, stresses that the media, particularly television, should be given priority; however, the same principles must be applied to the press. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation, and Serb entity authorities are obliged to secure fair access to the state media for all political parties and candidates; they must do the same for opposition parties and their candidates.

Experts of the Media Commission, formed by the Temporary Electoral Commission, will carefully monitor the media and the quality of reporting, and parties' and candidates' access to the media. Moreover, there is a need to establish an independent television station, which according to Carl Bildt, must be allotted a frequency. A formal request for founding the television station will be submitted to the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities before the end of the month. The license is expected at the beginning of May. All interested independent journalists and producers must be given the chance to contribute to the station, and the program must be [word indistinct] throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, in both entities. In case one of the sides fails to meet its obligations, alternative ways of securing fair access to the media will be implemented.

The statement will be submitted to Federation and Serb entity authorities. The Administrative Commission of the Council for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement, whose members meet once a month to review the progress of implementation, is currently in recess, Bildt said. Talks have been scheduled with Serb entity prime minister Rajko Kasagic and members of his delegation, Federation President Kresimir Zubak, Vice President Ejup Ganic, and members of the Ilidza Serbs' Democratic Initiative. (endall) 241700 ds/bonner

B-H: 'Independent' TV Channel Planned for Elections

AU2404174096 Paris AFP in English 1711 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SARAJEVO, April 24 (AFP)—A television channel to be used by "independent" broadcasters and run by the international community will be set up in Bosnia before elections are held, top civilian official Carl Bildt announced Wednesday.

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) could be asked to requisition the frequencies to allow programming from the stations affiliated to the channel to be received by viewers in both the Moslem-Croat and Serb entities, he said.

Bildt, who oversees the peace process in Bosnia, said he had sent a letter to authorities of the Moslem-Croat federation and Republika Srpska, which together make up post-war Bosnia, informing them of new rules for broadcasters.

Fair and free media access is considered essential if Bosnia is to hold free, fair and properly run post-war elections which are due, under the Dayton peace treaty, to be held by mid-September.

To date, most Bosnian residents, if they have access to television, must put up with a thin and heavily biased daily diet offered up by one or other of the two main broadcasters in Bosnia, each of which is strongly affiliated to one of the existing authorities.

Mainly Moslem Bosnian state television and the Serb-run Pale TV both provide heavily political broadcasting, eked out by foreign language films, chat shows and music.

Scattered around Bosnia are a number of local television stations—TV Mostar, TV Bihac, TV Zenica—with a very limited broadcasting range, while in Sarajevo, TV 99 provides a form of balance, offering determinedly pro-multi-ethnicity programming, favouring former premier Haris Silajdzic.

An official involved in the television project said there were two main thrusts in the international community's effort.

One is to "lift the capabilities" of the "independent" stations by boosting their broadcasting power, helping out on frequencies and giving training and some equipment.

The second is to create the new channel, as "a forum, sharing programming," which will be under the control of a body set up by the international community.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

It will take programming from existing broadcasters and stations and "will have an editorial and technical chapeau from the international community. It has to be watchable, alive, arresting. There is no use if no one watches it," the official said.

"It is not, I repeat not, Bildt TV," the official added, but refused to say who would be in charge of the project.

The money to underwrite the project, hoped to be up and running some time around June, will come from international donors, probably including the Soros Foundation, he added.

Bildt, speaking after a meeting of diplomats from Britain, Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Turkey and the United States to review the state of the peace process, said a "formal application for the use of the second network" would be sent to the Bosnian authorities by the end of this month.

"It is expected that this would be approved in early May," he said.

He said it was essential the Moslem-Croat and Serb authorities start fulfilling all their obligations in securing free and fair media.

Under the Dayton treaty, which was signed in Paris in December, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has set up a Media Experts Commission with a code of conduct for all the television and print media.

All media on both sides of the divide in Bosnia will be required to provide "equitable access for all political parties and election candidates," Bildt said.

B-H: Prlic, Hungarian FM Discuss Peace Process, Elections

AU2404180296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the state Presidency and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs today in Sarajevo and members of his delegation. They talked about the progress of the implementation of the Dayton peace accord and of the preparations for upcoming elections. It was concluded that there is still a very strong political influence by Karadzic and Mladic, who should be eliminated as soon as possible, because their influence considerably obstructs and slows down the peace process, that is, endangers the preparations, and could devalue the elections as well. Minister Kovacs was also received by Jadranko Prlic, foreign minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. At today's talks an agreement on trade cooperation and air traffic was reached, as well as several more agreements in the field of international law. [Words indistinct] and economy, as well as the participation of Hungarian firms in the process of the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, [Prlic?] said at the news conference after the meeting. Minister Prlic said that Hungary's donation amounting to $1 million would be invested in health care. Prlic and Kovacs have also made an initiative regarding the possible deployment of Hungarian soldiers within the Implementation Force [IFOR] to assist the construction of a temporary bridge across the Sava River for railway traffic. In addition to the bridges already constructed across the Neretva River and the signing of the agreement on the use of Ploce port, in the course of the next month we shall create all preconditions to reopen this communication that is supposed to benefit both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary, Prlic said.

B-H: Prlic, Hungary's Kovacs Reach Agreement

LD2404190996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Dr. Jadranko Prlic received in Sarajevo today Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. Jasna Primorac reports from Sarajevo:

[Begin Primorac recording] In today's talks with Mr. Kovacs, an agreement was reached on trade cooperation, air traffic, and a number of agreements in the sphere of international law. Agreement was also reached on closer cooperation between the two countries in the area of the economy and the inclusion of Hungarian collectives in the renewal and reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Foreign Minister Prlic said at a news conference after the meeting with Laszlo Kovacs. He said that a donation of $1 million from Hungary would be invested in the health service and that views were exchanged on the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Republic of Hungary, Prlic said, will support our membership of the international organizations that we wish to join. We also launched an initiative for the possible involvement of Hungarian troops, as part of IFOR, to build a temporary bridge across the Sava River for rail traffic. With the bridges already built across the Neretva River and the agreement signed on the use of the port of Ploce, during the coming month we will have created all the preconditions for the activation of this route, which will be used by both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary, Prlic said.

Minister Kovacs referred to his two previous visits to Sarajevo, stressing that on those occasions he was seek-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

ing possibilities for the conclusion of a peace agreement, while today he is talking about its effective implementation and the rapprochement of the two countries at all levels. He said that views were exchanged on the peace process in general in the south Slav region, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and noted that a lasting peace is not possible without returning the population to the places from which they were expelled.

Kovacs added that they examined the most pressing steps needed for the strengthening of economic cooperation, and that to this end the Hungarian side will formulate a number of programs and projects. [end recording]

B-H: PM Muratovic Discusses Economic Aid With U.S. Envoy

AU2404193196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Zineida Adilovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met today with William Montgomery, special advisor to U.S. President Bill Clinton in affairs regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction. The topic discussed at the talks was improvement in the economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the meeting the two officials addressed journalists with brief statements. Zineida Adilovic reports.

[Adilovic] Montgomery assessed the meeting as follows:

[Montgomery, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Mr. Muratovic and I had a very good conversation regarding the program of our aid. We will try to work out concrete projects in the field in the shortest possible time. I also recalled the tragic accident of U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, which encouraged us to continue working in that direction at a quicker pace, (?which we gladly did). I hope that [words indistinct]. We also talked about a bilateral agreement that will hopefully be signed next week to lay the foundations for this aid.

[Adilovic] Prime Minister Muratovic expressed his satisfaction with this meeting.

[Muratovic] We expect that in three to four weeks the economic aid program will enter upon its full realization, primarily (?in form of credits) private and (?verbal aid) amounting to $80 million dollars, but we also talked about a (?third) fund that would make it possible for firms capable of fast recovery [word indistinct] to immediately get some means necessary for that. I believe that we will be looking for some special solutions. I have invited Mr. Montgomery to visit cantons and municipalities together with us, as our high delegation did [words indistinct]. We also talked about a road toward Gorazde, and I believe we are in good shape to get that project going.

B-H: Iranian Envoy Hands Rafsanjani Message to Izetbegovic

LD2504083696 Tehran IRNA in English 0554 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 25, IRNA—Iran's Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian in a meeting here Wednesday with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, submitted a message from his Iranian counterpart Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

In his message, President Rafsanjani congratulated the Bosnian president and the nation on the occasion of E'id ul-Adha, marking the great Islamic Feast of Sacrifice, April 29.

The Iranian president also expressed hope that with the cooperation of all Islamic governments, the unity among Muslims throughout the globe will be further consolidated.

The latest international and regional developments were among major topics discussed by the two officials.

In another development, Taherian met with rais-ul-ulema of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mufti Mustafa Tiric on Wednesday.

Congratulating him on the occasion of E'id ul-Adha, Taherian stated that all world Muslims are bound to support the defenceless people of Lebanon against crimes committed by the Zionist regime.

In the meeting, the latest situation in the Balkan region as well as promotion of Tehran-Sarajevo relations were reviewed.

B-H: SDA Commitment to Integral State Questioned

AU2304073196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 17 Apr 96 p 4

[Report on interview with Mustafa Pamuk, member of the Executive Commission of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Edina Kamenica; place and date not given: "The HDZ Is Tearing the State Apart, the SDA Is Keeping Silent"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the 14 April rally in Zenica, in front of more than 20,000 people, Alija Izetbegovic, Presidency president of the Republic

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], delivered a lengthy speech, touching upon the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had been founded the evening before.

"Let them have it," Izetbegovic said among things, and continued: "Still, it is more likely that they are struggling for power in Bosnia, rather than for Bosnia, which is not the same thing."

"I think the president has exaggerated the issue a little bit," Mustafa Pamuk, member of the Executive Commission of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, says, explaining: "The people who have joined this party are not struggling for power at any cost, but they will certainly struggle for the preservation of an integral Bosnia at any cost. Everything that has been done recently regarding the implementation of the Dayton accord—all the consultations to this end and all the solutions adopted—cast doubt upon the sincerity of the struggle of the current Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the current ruling party for an integral Bosnia, which is what they are stressing incessantly."

We ask Pamuk to be more concrete.

"Everything that a number of ongoing debates involves is leading, actually, toward internal rifts. After all, this was seen clearly at the latest assembly, which was interrupted because certain debates and demands definitely led in that direction. Regarding this, I can say that there is a strong political trend, the main goal of which is—to divide Bosnia," Pamuk maintains.

Division Into Entities

President Izetbegovic also repeated his party's election slogan in Zenica: "We want an integral Bosnia." Who does not?

"The main supporters of the trend that I have just mentioned are the people engaged in negotiations," Pamuk says, explaining that "the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] is doing everything to postpone the implementation of the Dayton accord, while the SDA is gradually accepting such attitudes, thereby playing into the hands of those who want to divide up Bosnia."

According to Pamuk, an example of this undermining is the HDZ's demand for the establishment of an agency that will substitute for the central bank, which no reasonable person would consider of benefit to the implementation of the Dayton accord. On the contrary, if this agency is founded, the HDZ will get a chance to procrastinate in the implementation of what we already agreed on at Wright-Patterson airbase. Because, according to Pamuk, by this, the HDZ will get its own monetary institution, which would enable Herzeg-Bosnia to get involved in international financial courses, which, in itself, would be tacit recognition.

"If we allow this to happen, the division of the Federation into entities will be even more imminent," Pamuk warns, adding that the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina supports exclusively a federation of cantons, rather than a federation of peoples.

"This is a condition for our achieving an integral Bosnia," he maintains, adding: "However, Croatian hawks want precisely the opposite, while the others, from the SDA, are reconciled with it."

We Have No Tutor

We recall that President Izetbegovic said in Zenica that the party led by Haris Silajdzic wanted to free part of Bosnia that has already been freed. "On the other hand, they are leaving the misfortunate, unliberated part to others," the SDA chairman said on that occasion. Are you really leaving it to others? we ask Pamuk.

"I did not understand the president's point very well, but I know what is the only way for people to free themselves in peacetime from everything, and even from their own misery. The current authorities, that is, the current ruling parties, and primarily the SDA, must put pressure on the international factors, so that all the refugees and displaced persons can return to their homes. They should not be settling them in freed areas, and even in Sarajevo's freed suburbs, which is obviously being done. Some will say 'But we are constantly inviting people to return.' But where to? Where to?" Pamuk repeats.

He warns that there is huge pressure from the international institutions on Bosnia, on Sarajevo, that the homes of people from the other entity ought to remain vacant, which would enable them to return.

"What are we doing to make it reciprocal, to ensure that Bosniak houses, Bosniak flats, and Bosniak farms will remain vacant in that entity, so that the Bosniaks can return?" Pamuk wonders.

President Izetbegovic has, in a way, accused the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina of attempting to "bring the Bosniak people to its senses," or more precisely, "to pacify it."

"Regardless of the fact that this was stated by the president, whom I hold in high esteem indeed, I have to say that his point was just a sort of verbal acrobatics. The president, as well as many other people, often speak about the unity of the Bosniak people. Why? Because they want to preserve their own monopoly over the political opinion of that people. Otherwise, how are we

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

supposed to understand the allegations about something that has not yet taken root?" Pamuk points out.

In a way, the newly founded party was reproached in Zenica for its allegedly holding the opinion that the SDA is struggling for a Muslim Bosnia. Is this true?

"I am firmly convinced that the SDA is for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but everything it has been doing lately encourages those who claim that its goal is some sort of ethnically reduced Bosnia," Pamuk says. [passage omitted]

B-H: Mostar Mayor Discusses May Elections With EU's Casado

AU2404195996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the mayor of the eastern [Bosniak] part of Mostar, Safet Orucevic, received Ricardo Perez Casado, the new EU administrator for Mostar, in the building of the Presidency of Mostar Municipality. Mirsad Behram reports on the details of this meeting.

[Behram] The coming elections in Mostar, scheduled for May, and the economy and reconstruction of the city were the main topics of the talks between Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar, and Ricardo Perez Casado, new EU administrator. The meeting between the two was closed to the press. After the meeting Orucevic and Casado briefly addressed the media representatives present there.

Asked whether he expected that the elections—anticipated in the Dayton accord to be held by the end of May—would indeed be held by then, administrator Casado said:

[Casado, in Spanish with consecutive translation into Serbo-Croatian] Our wish is to meet the deadlines anticipated by the Dayton accord. However, one has to keep in mind that certain preconditions have to be created that will satisfy the parties concerned.

[Behram] The Bosniak side's attitude is that all the people who want a unified Mostar have to struggle to make possible the conducting of elections as soon as possible, Mayor Orucevic said. He emphasized that one ought to determine now the minimal degree of human freedom to be secured for the holding of the May elections.

[Orucevic] We will of course demand that all the citizens of Mostar be entitled to vote, regardless of where they are now, and that they be enabled to return to Mostar at least to vote in the elections. The deadlines set in Dayton are being extended in many fields, so they will perhaps be extended in this one as well, but that will certainly not make any considerable impact on the elections, or bring about any definitive postponement of the elections. I think that Mostar's friends ought to come here and vote for the unified city council of the city of Mostar, by which they will certainly help the unification of this city in the best possible way.

[Behram] The Bosniak side believes that the citizens of Mostar who are currently residing in third countries should at least return to Mostar to vote in the elections, Orucevic says, adding that this matter will be subsequently discussed even more. According to him, freedom of movement is still considerably limited in the city, and the ban on the establishment of political parties is still in force, particularly in the western part of the city. At the next meeting of the cantonal council of [words indistinct] the Bosniak side will submit a demand for discussion of the creation of conditions for the elections, Orucevic pointed out.

B-H: Muslim Air Force Flights 'Banned' for 'Indefinite Period'

LD2404185696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1737 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr 24 (TANJUG)—NATO has banned all flights of Muslim military aircraft for an indefinite period following several unauthorized take-offs Sunday during a military parade in Bihac, western Bosnia.

The ban, made public Wednesday in Sarajevo, follows the flight of two helicopters and two airplanes during the parade without NATO permission, news agencies report.

The NATO-led IFOR [Implementation Force] forces are in full control of Bosnia's airspace in line with the Dayton peace accord and the former parties to the conflict must request permission for take-offs 72 hours in advance.

IFOR Spokesman Major Simon Haselock said Muslim army received permission to use two planes during the parade, one special aircraft for recording the event and two aircraft for Alija Izetbegovic and other Muslim officials.

However, additional unauthorized flights were also carried out.

As a result of this violation, the commander of NATO land forces in Bosnia General Michael Walker has banned all flights of Muslim airforce, Haselock said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Federation, Serb Delegates Discuss Brcko Priorities

AU2404201996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Admir Kadric from Brcko area—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A local level meeting was held today between the Bosniak-Croat delegation and representatives of the Serb entity in Lieutenant Colonel (Tony Cucolo's) Implementation Force headquarters located in the separation zone between free Brcko territories and the town of Brcko. The meeting focused on joint reconstruction of the housing facilities and industrial installations throughout Brcko municipality that were destroyed in the war. Admir Kadric has the details.

[Kadric] All the participants in the meeting feel that it passed in a constructive atmosphere. Following the meeting, we asked Brcko Municipal Governor [?Mijuskovic] to tell us about concrete measures agreed on at today's meeting, which primarily pertain to the reconstruction of property in the separation zone. More than 1,000 Bosniak houses are located in the separation zone.

[(?Mijuskovic)] We shall survey the entire separation zone. I have volunteered to do the job since we have all the data needed to establish property relations in the entire separation zone. We have already agreed on the priorities and decided who [words indistinct]. We now need to take concrete....

[Kadric] Can you tell us what the Serb, Croat, and our priorities are?

[(?Mijuskovic)] The Serbs have to decide what their priorities are. Today I informed them that some 117 facilities in the separation zone are in Serb ownership. The Croats have opted for Boderiste and Lipovac, while our priorities are known: Brod, Tegovaca, and Dizdarusa.

[Kadric] We asked Milenko Pajic, head of the Serb entity's delegation to summarize the second, extremely important part of the meeting, namely, the reconstruction of industrial installations in the municipality.

[Pajic] As far as industrial installations are concerned, we have agreed that the best way to start is to reconstruct the Bimex and Bimal plants, since their technologies make it possible for us to market the products throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. [sentence as heard] At the same time, it offers the possibility for farmers to market their produce throughout the entity on commercial basis.

[Kadric] (?Asked) when he thought Brcko would again belong to Brcko citizens, Zarko Cosic, member of the Serb delegation and the police chief in the [words indistinct] interesting information as to who is currently residing in our city.

[Cosic] Well, I don't know, this is a difficult question. Personally, I believe that we have some 30,000 refugees in Brcko. We have to secure accommodation for them; these people have come from 105 municipalities throughout the former Yugoslavia. It would be absurd for you to come to Brcko now and find a man with a five- or 10-member family (?in your house). This would certainly be cause for an incident. That is why I support peace, but step by step. Conditions must first be created for people to return.

[Kadric] Today's agreement shows that significant progress has been made. During the Bayram holidays, instead of the usual 50, 150 expelled Brcko citizens can now regularly visit their cemeteries. They firmly believe that this is the way to a definite return.

B-H: Bosnia, Russia Struggle With Telecom Plans

BR0504141696 London COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL in English Mar 96 pp 81-82, 84, 86

[Article by Malcolm Taylor and Lanna Rozen: "Eastern Promise"]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The chaotic state of Russian telecommunications is legendary. That the Federal Republic needed a unified network offering a commonality of service was never in any doubt, but services from the 85 local operators, linked by a transit network provided by long distance and international operator Rostelecom, were of greatly varying quality and consistency. In the summer of 1995, in an effort to solve the problem, the Russian government consolidated all its interests in the local operators into a single entity, AO Svyazinvest. The intent was to find a Western partner willing to buy 25 percent of the newly established holding company. It was hoped that such a move would not only secure much needed investment for the venture, but also help to make up the shortfall in the income raised from various privatiszation exercises all of which were adding to the Russian government's massive budget deficit. To make the deal more palatable, it was decided that Svyazinvest would be given a licence to provide long distance and international services, in competition with Rostelecom.

An international banking consortium was appointed by the Russian Privatisation Centre to approach the world's leading telecommunications operators and invite them to tender. The intention was that bidders would purchase

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

an initial stake for a minimum of US$1.2 billion, then pay a further $770 million over two years; a further public offering of another 24 percent of Svyazinvest was also planned for this year. The fact that Svyazinvest effectively had neither staff, assets nor infrastructure was seen as a distinct advantage by the Russians. Tendering was to open on 17 October and close on 30 November 1995.

More Haste, Less Speed

The extremely short response time for the initial bidding process circumscribed any major investor's attempts to undertake a full investigation into the proposal, and the small amount of information that was available was limited to that supplied by the Privatisation Centre itself. A number of Scandinavian, European and North American operators have been active in Russia for some time. One of these, US West, had already been an equal partner with Rostelecom in two joint ventures: Dontelecom and United Telecom. Rostelecom was also a partner in the Russian Overlay Network with some 80 of the local operators.

With so many companies already in the country it seemed that Svyazinvest might be spoilt for choice. But, in the event, only two parties actually made proposals. The first was a consortium representing France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and US West—considering the three were partners in Roscom and were already providing fixed, mobile and long distance services in the country, this was hardly any surprise. What was a surprise was that STET suddenly appeared in the picture. The Italian company, having been unsuccessful in a number of European bids, had turned a lot of its attention to Latin America and some analysts were intrigued as to how Russia would fit into STET's plans. It should be remembered, however, that STET subsidiaries were active in the provision of the ITUR submarine optical link, a number of manufacturing and software joint ventures and the provision of a Russian GSM network. In the event, when the deadline expired STET was the only bidder left and, therefore, apparent winner by default. However, at the end of December 1995 nothing had been agreed. STET was in the position of still waiting for answers to some vital questions, but put a brave face on it and maintained that it would still acquire the quarter share. entre thought otherwise and said the deal was off. It seems that the Russians had taken exception to STET's request that its investment be held in trust until it had been satisfied that all its conditions had been met.

Certainly, given the timescale involved, many substantive items remained unresolved at the time the bidding ended. These included safeguards with regard to relations with Rostelecom, pricing, licensing conditions and regulatory requirements. Presumably the lack of answers to these, and similar, questions could have caused other consortia not to bid.

So, what now? Well, the partial sell off of Svyazinvest goes back to square one and, once again, STET's ambitions to become a major European player have turned to dust and ashes.The lesson has been that major telecomms restructuring exercises, especially those involving foreign companies, take time and meticulous attention to detail.

When Svyazinvest comes up for sale again it is more likely to succeed if the process is undertaken with much less haste and much more thought.

Bosnia's Recovery Plan

As Bosnia gears up to reconstruct its war-torn telecomms network, it has been forced to decide between what is essential and what would be nice to have. A map in the Sarajevo office of the International Management Group (IMG)—charged with advising Bosnia on rebuilding its telecomms infrastructure—now lists 22 priority telecomms projects.

Another advisor, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), has come up with a short-term priority programme to help Bosnia pace itself through the massive, US$300 million telecomms reconstruction.

But, despite the enormity of the task, there is considerable optimism. The priority for 1996 is to replace what was destroyed during four years of fighting; in 1997 and beyond, the PTT Bosnia i Herzegovina (BiH) will modernise and expand its post-war network.

But for now, the main challenge facing planners is getting to grips with what the market has to offer.

"What we need most," says Hamdo Katitsa, a technical development specialist with PTT Sarajevo, "is information." Katitsa has made several trips to Germany and Italy to meet potential telecomms equipment suppliers, but he feels he lacks a broad overview of the market.

He is learning fast, though. Suppliers are now starting to come to him. For example, LanCom has recently made a presentation to the PTT on the benefits of installing an AMPS cellular network.

But despite the current spate of incomers, it is LM Ericsson (LME), with its 1995 purchase of a majority stake in Nikola Tesla of Croatia, that has the strongest position in Bosnia's historical and emerging telecomms supplier market. Sarajevo's network is comprised of LME AXE-10 local exchanges, although Iskratel of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovenia has also provided a 5,000-line switch. Siemens, which is completing construction of a 6,500-line EWSD international exchange to Bosnia, its second in that country, is also lining up to become a leading supplier to PTT BiH.

In many ways, Bosnia's telecommunications network is not as dysfunctional as one might expect after years of bitter civil war. For example, it is perfectly possible to make an international call provided you think ahead and order an international connection far enough in advance, and are prepared to pay the US$680 price tag. It is also possible to dial in from abroad without too much of a hassle—but that's about the limit of the network's functionality.

What Was Destroyed

The graceful, Austro-Hungarian PTT building in downtown Sarajevo, which was opened by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was gutted by shell fire in May 1992. Three city exchanges with a total capacity of 38,432 lines were totally destroyed, and a further 45,000 city lines were put out of action.

PTT BiH says that, overall, 70 percent of the country's transmission facilities were destroyed. In addition, the PTT has lost thousands of trained staff, either as soldiers, civilian casualties or as refugees and several important reconstruction projects have been delayed as a result. In total, PTT Sarajevo puts the total cost of damage to buildings and the telecomms infrastructure in Sarajevo at $120 million. The repair bill for the country's telecomms sector will amount to 31 billion.

Funding

However, unlike other expensive infrastructure projects, such as the rebuilding of destroyed roads, and the restoration of gas and electricity services, the telecomms sector has a unique place in the country's reconstruction effort. Once the switches and transmission systems have been reconstructed, the sector is expected to be largely self-supporting and self-financing, since there is a huge demand for telecomms services, from POTS lines to advanced data-comms facilities.

While that is good news in some respects, it does have a downside. Thus, while the EBRD has been seeking grants for most of Bosnia's reconstruction programme, the telecomms sector is expected to be able to repay loans.

Sweden has pledged $1.271 minion to cover the cost of a new international link, due to be installed this month and implemented by SIDA. The EBRD also says it is preparing to make some $300 million of loans available to the PTT. It will take a lot of calls to pay that back. [passage omitted]

B-H: Gradacac Official Warns of 'Wave of Returnees' in Jun

AU2404194196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Ernes Hadzimuhamedovic from Gradacac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member Nijaz Durakovic used his brief visit to Gradacac to meet the representatives of the municipality. Municipal secretary Hazim Novalic informed Mr. Durakovic about the current situation in the municipality, and the problems that have been burdening the everyday lives of the Gradacac people since the signing of the Dayton agreement, emphasizing the problem of employing the demobilized members of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army, problems with the water supplies, and the repair of war damages.

On top of all this, Gradacac has recently been facing a new problem: The people expelled from Bosnian Posavina, who have spent the last four years in western European countries, have been returning daily in an attempt to get closer to their homes in Modrica, Bosanski Samac, and Brcko. The question of where to accommodate them is almost an insurmountable problem, as some 10,000 expelled persons who are already accommodated in the municipality do not have a more permanent address. This problem becomes even greater if one takes into account the increasingly serious announcement of a wave of returnees in June.

Mr. Durakovic called on the municipal representatives to become even more engaged and agile in their contacts with the Federation and Republic Governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These issues can probably be solved through high quality programs.

B-H: Bihac Police Locate Mass Grave Near Kulen Vakuf

AU2504104396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A mass grave was discovered in the area between the villages of Luzine and Rajanovci near Orasac, in the proximity of Kulen Vakuf. According to the unofficial assessments by experts of the Bihac security services' center, this grave contains at least 20 bodies.

Following an inspection by the Bihac security services' center, physicians from the Bihac regional medical center will visit the site and start excavating the grave. There is a possibility that this mass grave is connected to

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the disappearance of 120 men whom Chetniks separated from a convoy of civilians on the Trbave bridge in June 1992.

B-H: Muslims Said Planning Another Entry Into Doboj

LD2404152096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 24 Apr (SRNA)—According to announcements in the Muslim media, Muslims from Tesanj could make another mass attempt on Sunday, 28 April to forcefully cross the state border of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic at the village of Usce and to enter the area of the municipality. [passage omitted]

B-H: Zvornik: Serbs Attempt Forced Entry Into Bosniak Homes

AU2404202796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Zvornik Municipality Refugee Return Commission has warned about threats against inhabitants of the village of Dugi Brijeg, in the Zvornik area, who have lately been exposed to constant provocation by the Serb police and civilians.

Yesterday, the villagers were exposed to new provocation. Over 200 Serb civilians, most probably refugees from the Sarajevo area, accompanied by armed individuals, attempted to force their way into Bosniak houses. While attempting to do so, the attackers fired automatic rifles. According to the latest information, the situation in the village has escalated, and there is a possibility of new incidents.

B-H: Serb TV Crew Finds 'No Trace' of 50 Muslims in Doboj

AU2404190996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Apr 96

[Report by Ozren Jorganovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Saturday [20 April] the Muslims attempted an unauthorized and abrupt entry into Doboj. However, determined action by the people of Doboj thwarted their intention. Misinformed and set on by their masters, the Muslims got what they deserved, but to justify themselves in front of those who gave them their vote, Muslim self-proclaimed leaders are now trying to patch things up. [passage omitted]

The man says his name is Reuf Mehmedagic and claims to be head of the Doboj municipality. Our Serb Television team spent an entire morning at the seat of the Doboj municipality looking for an official of that name, but could not find him. We only met Drago Ljubicic, president of the Doboj municipality, but Reuf was nowhere to be found.

In keeping with their intention to get where they do not belong, the Muslims are becoming more and more creative. [passage omitted]

In addition to looking for Reuf Mehmedagic, your reporters also searched for 50 Muslims who remained in Doboj. We went into every garage, parks, cafes, and cellars, but could not find them. Even IFOR looked for them from the air late last night. But to no avail. There is no trace of the Muslims. I guess they must be lost somewhere in Tesanj.

B-H: Serbs Protest Bosniak Attempts To Enter Serb Entity

AU2404162096 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by V. Mitric: "Violence Is Growing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several hundreds of bellicose Muslims coming from the direction of Kalesija have been trying for three days now to force their way into the Serb villages of Kitovnice, Desice, and Setice, 25 km northwest of Zvornik. Yelling, shouting threats and using force, these Muslim groups are trying to seize control of part of the Serb Republic.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI has learned this at the Zvornik barracks headquarters of the Serb Republic Army, whose members withdrew from the previous front lines in a timely manner in compliance with the Dayton agreement.

"The Muslims' forceful entry into Serb Republic territory is unacceptable, because this actually means a violation of the territory that has been ceded to the Serbs in line with the Dayton accord. The worst thing is that those groups are led by Muslim war criminals who took part in mass and the most brutal killings of Serbs in the villages of Parlog and Kamenica," Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, commander of the Zvornik barracks, says.

The Muslims who are violating Serb territory are carrying crescent moon flags which they want to stick in Serb land. The local Serbs have been successfully repelling these uninvited guests for three days now, but their persistence seems to be inexhaustible. We have learned that in the clashes so far, there have been a number of slightly and seriously injured people on both sides. Batons are being used in much of the fighting.

The situation is even more complicated because the Muslims involved are still residing in villages ceded to the Serb Republic. Instead of enabling the Serb police

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to enter the villages and establish the Serb Republic's authority there, in line with the Dayton accord, over the past few days the Muslims have been trying to expand their territory. Unlike them, the Serbs have already left the regions that are supposed to belong to the Muslim-Croatian federation. The Serb side stresses that the international police have not expressed any serious readiness to prevent incidents on the border between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croatian federation.

B-H: Serb Refugees Prevented From Visiting Glamoc Graves

LD2404215396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2010 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 24 April (TANJUG)—About 600 Glamoc Serbs scattered all over the [Bosnian] Serb Republic were today sent back from the border crossing in Mliniste, about 30 km from Glamoc, between Glamoc and Mrkonjic Grad. In the company of Bishop Hrizostom of Bihac and Petrovac, they intended to visit the graves of their nearest and dearest.

Not even after four hours of talks was the bishop allowed to enter Glamoc. He and the refugees were told they were not wanted in Glamoc and that they would be stoned.

All this was happening in front of the European observers, IFOR [Implementation Force], the UNHCR, and journalists.

The Glamoc Serbs went back to Mrkonjic Grad and there—on the graves of 40 unknown Serb civilians and soldiers, victims of Croat-Muslim aggression—they placed their flowers and lit their candles.

B-H: Tribunal Head: Karadzic, Mladic Arrests Out of Question

AU2404191796 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Antonio Cassese, president of the Hague Tribunal, stated that the arrest of Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, Serb Republic Army chief of General Staff, is out of the question, because, he explains, the act would lead to massive bloodshed.

B-H: Karadzic's Protection Measures Disclosed

96P20400A Maribor VECER in Slovene 9 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Zarko Rajkovic: "Serbs Cheated Themselves"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade [Passage omitted]—The town of Janja, 20 kilometers from Brcko, is the headquarters of the Bosnian Serb special police units who celebrated there their fourth anniversary. Since the end of the war, their main mission has been to protect Radovan Karadzic from the IFOR units who would like to deliver him to The Hague. During his visit to Belgrade, one of the 2,000 Karadzic's guards, while under the influence of alcohol, disclosed how they protect the Serbian leader. He asserted that IFOR would never apprehend Karadzic because he is surrounded by three protection zones; the first zone covers the distance up to 100 kilometers, the second extends from 20 to 30 kilometers, and the third covers his immediate surroundings. Asked where Karadzic is at the moment, he replied: "I do not know, but he is safe."

B-H: Kasagic Attends Sarajevo Meeting Chaired by Bildt

LD2404220496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2137 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, April 24 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Republika Srpska (R.S.), Bosnian Serb state, headed by Premier Rajko Kasagic, attended in Sarajevo on Wednesday a meeting of the steering committee of the council for the Dayton peace accords implementation.

The meeting, which was chaired by High Representative for Bosnia Carl Bildt, was attended also by officials of the European Union, Russia, France, Japan, Canada, Italy, Germany, Turkey and the United States. The committee holds its monthly meetings in Brussels.

Kasagic told reporters in Pale after the meeting that the Serb side had submitted a programme of the development of the Republika Srpska, which he said Bildt and the majority of the officials attending the meeting had accepted.

Kasagic said, "I have underlined that it will be difficult to revive production in both entities (the Republika Srpska and the Moslem-Croat Federation) if the power grid is not repaired first and that the damage of the power grid running through the Republika Srpska is estimated at 400 million German marks."

He said the officials had expressed their regret that the Republika Srpska had not participated in the recent donors conference in Brussels. The officials also showed interest in preparations for elections to be held in September.

The Republika Srpska did not send its delegation to the conference that has raised 1.2 billion dollars for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it did not want to be part of Bosnia's single delegation.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Kasagic said it was vital to secure freedom of movement and circulation of goods and capital throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as freedom of media which he said must be at the disposal of all parties that wanted to participate in the elections.

B-H: Kasagic on Program for Reconstruction of Serb Republic

LD2404195796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1829 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 24 Apr (SRNA)—In Sarajevo today, Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic forwarded a program concerning the reconstruction and vision of the Serb Republic to the management board of the team led by Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community.

After the meeting, Kasagic told reporters of SRNA and Serb TV that members of the management board of Bildt's team expressed satisfaction with the program for the reconstruction and development of the Serb Republic; although, during the talks they kept drawing attention to the development of joint systems together with the federation.

Quoting, as one of the examples, the damage to the electricity supply system in the Serb Republic, which amounted to some 400 million German marks, Kasagic said these systems were already being developed within the Serb Republic and that work on their connection was hampered by many factors, the most important one being the large number—about 4 million—of all types of mines. [passage omitted]

"We are asking that development programs be realized faster so that we can provide work for the unemployed and face the next winter with our roads repaired, problems of our infrastructure resolved, and heating system in towns repaired," said Kasagic.

Replying to the question—how prepared is Bildt's team to support the programs that only concern the Serb Republic—Kasagic said the expert commissions of the high representative entrusted with certain areas of economic and social life would be examining the presented programs in detail.

"We were still not given the resources, but over the next few days we will be contacting the European fund for social development with a request for about $200 million and we are hoping that they will show the same level of cooperation with us as they did with the federation," said the Serb Republic prime minister.

Other topics discussed today were freedom of the media and freedom of movement for civilians, commodities, and capital.

B-H: Kasagic, France's Godin View Donors' Conference, Elections

AU2404184396 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic also talked to the French ambassador in Sarajevo, (Yves Godin), in Pale today about the situation following the donors' conference and the upcoming election.

"We were introduced to the reasons for the Serb Republic's refusal to attend the conference in Brussels. France's position is that the international aid must be divided between both entities depending on the needs that arise," said (Godin) after the meeting.

Thanking the French Government for its efforts toward facilitating such treatment, Kasagic said that the French ambassador was introduced to the position that all the registered parties in the Serb Republic will be guaranteed free presentation in the media during the upcoming preelection and election activities.

Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha also attended the talks.

B-H: Srbac Serb Socialists Want 'Close Ties' to Serbia

AU2404151996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by Radovan Brankov from Srbac on the promotion rally by the SP of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb entity]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the culture hall in the center of Srbac the Socialists of the area spoke about their future activities and the work of their party.

Democracy and justice are the basic commitments of the first municipal [word indistinct] conference in Srbac. This was stressed by members and sympathizers of the Socialist Party [SP]. Nikola (?Poglosarac), chairman of the Serb Republic's SP municipal committee, first said that the erroneous policies of the current authorities had isolated the Serb people from almost the entire world. The tough situation in which the Serb people found themselves had created a demand for a new social and political force in the Serb Republic. Soon after being formed, the SP started winning an increasing number of supporters.

One has to stress that the current authorities did not exactly welcome the formation of the SP in the Srbac municipality. Although the Srbac SP has been active in difficult semilegal circumstances, it has been making efforts to contribute as much as possible to the defense

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the Serb people and the Serb Republic. The Srbac Socialists believe that their future lies in links with the Republic of Serbia and the FRY.

Zarko Saric spoke about the state of the public information services in the area. It is only on rare occasions that we can tell these people that the SP is sincerely committed to close ties with the Republic of Serbia and the FRY, unlike some who stress the same publicly, but really want a [word indistinct] in which they can rule for ever.

Zivko Radisic, vice chairman of the Serb Republic SP, spoke about the many problems facing the activities of the party in the Serb Republic, expressing his wish to see the SP in its rightful place in this Balkan whirlpool. Despite all the blockades, Zivko Radisic said, we have managed to survive and to be alive today. [sentence as heard]

B-H: SPRS President Reports 'Physical Attacks' by SDS

AU2504102296 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by B. Maric: "Authorities Threaten With Terrorism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "When the houses of two Socialist Party members were blown up in Bileca, the Serb Republic [RS] sailed dangerously close to the waters of political terrorism," Dr. Dragutin Ilic, president of the SPRS [Socialist Party of the Serb Republic], said.

With such moves by "irresponsible individuals," he added, major damage is being done to the Serb people and the ruling party in the RS, the Serb Democratic Party [SDS].

"Should I remind you that the enemies of the Serb people claimed that the SDS is a terrorist party and that they also wanted to impose such a stand on the international community, demanding that it sever all relations with the SDS and the RS," Ilic said.

He pointed out that the Socialists have been systematically filing all data on attacks against them in the last two months and are soon going to publicize those.

"At first, we believed that attacks against the SPRS and its activists were the result of the activity of some local bullies. After all that happened, we have the impression that all the attacks against the SPRS are being planned in a single center and that the SDS is behind them," Ilic cautions.

He gave the example of the events before the SPRS promotion in [Bosanski] Samac. On the eve of the gathering, Samac Radio, a part of the state electronic media, broadcast a report that the Socialists were bringing five buses of Muslims and Croats to town.

"It was presented that we want to surrender the town to the Muslims and Croats. In this way, the authorities tried to provoke a negative reaction from the citizens and even a forcible ban on the gathering," Ilic said.

Just how far the SDS efforts to discredit the Socialists can go, Ilic says, can be seen from what he was told at the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Monitor Mission.

The OCSE monitors said that the SDS had warned them that the Socialists are "working for" Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and that their task is to join the RS to the mother country, whereby a Greater Serbia would be created, Ilic pointed out.

At the same time, he said, the RS authorities are pushing a completely different thesis in their media: If the Socialists win, then nothing will remain of the RS—they are going to join the Serb state to the unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Socialists can get away with these political frame-ups, as low as they may be, Ilic pointed out. However, physical attacks against them and the property of their prominent members have become so intensive that they are not only threatening SPRS members, but also the international position of the RS.

"When the head of the Public Security Center in Prijedor said that he would send the police to disperse the Socialists gathering in Omarska, this testified to the violence that the authorities exert against people with different political views. What the RS needs least this moment is such an image," Ilic added.

"If the SDS firmly believes that it created the state and that it did everything in the people's interest, then why is it wary of elections?" Ilic asked.

"I am convinced that repression against political opponents cannot ensure an SDS victory at the coming elections. The SPRS will respect the results of these elections even if it loses. Of course, we shall try to win the elections, irrespective of what the SDS and the RS authorities are doing to us," Ilic said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: SNS's Dodik Predicts Election Defeat for SDS

AU2204171696 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with Milorad Dodik, chairman of the SNS of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serb entity, by Boro Maric; place and date not given: "Battle for Legal Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Serb Republic will be voting for its future at the elections. The people are aware of that and that is why I am convinced that the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] led by Radovan Karadzic will be defeated," says Milorad Dodik, chairman of the Party of Independent Social Democrats [SNS], assessing the importance and outcome of the elections in the Serb Republic.

The SDS is entering the election race with two basic claims: That it created the Serb Republic and that, if it loses the elections, the state will cease to exist; it will "drown" in a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dodik says, adding:

"Such political narcissism is typical of totalitarian regimes. Instead of saying 'The state is me,' the SDS is saying 'The state is us.' The people are fed up with such an attitude toward them and their struggle for the Serb Republic."

[Maric] It is a fact that the SDS won most of the Serb votes at the last elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Might that give it the right to consider itself a state-forming party?

[Dodik] The aggressiveness of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] enabled the SDS to win. Since 1993 and particularly since mid-1994 when the Contact Group plan was rejected, the SDS has been conducting a losers' policy. Between then and the recognition of the crucial role of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in the negotiations, the Serb Republic leadership had been losing people, territory, and property. Had the Dayton agreement not stopped the war, there would have hardly been anything left of the Serb Republic.

To Fit Two Men

[Maric] Some 30 parties have declared that they will run in the elections. In your view, which ones have the greatest chances of success?

[Dodik] The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, the SNS, and the United Left represent serious political forces. Nor should the SDS and the Serbian Radical Party be underestimated, since they play on people's emotional responses. Some of the votes will go to the Serbian People's Party, the People's Radical Party Nikola Pasic, and the Serbian Patriotic Party.

[Maric] What do you think the people expect from the elections?

[Dodik] First and foremost, to get legal and legitimate authorities, authorities that will, within a realistic framework, strengthen the statehood of the Serb Republic, strengthen it economically, and bring it to the same international level as the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SDS cannot do this.

[Maric] Why not?

[Dodik] The Serb Republic's statehood cannot be strengthened by self-isolation and a refusal to deal with the outside world. The most recent example was the nonparticipation of the Serb Republic's representatives at the Brussels donors' conference for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb Republic leadership is behaving along the lines of: If Karadzic and Krajisnik cannot go—and generally they cannot go anywhere—then no one else should go, either. The only exceptions are their trusted aides, but the world does not have much to say to them. The power of every country is measured by its economic strength and the Serb Republic has been reduced to utter poverty. Since the end of the war, the state leadership has done nothing to revive the economy.

[Maric] The peace agreement stipulates that refugees should also vote in the elections and vote in places where they lived before the war. Is that realistic?

[Dodik] It could be realistic if the refugees return home. This way, for example, it is certain that the Serbs would win in Drvar since they are not likely to vote for the HDZ or any other party in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But what is it supposed to mean if the Serbs are not allowed to return to Drvar or if they do not want to return?

Mutual Intimidation

[Maric] You have been meeting with the leaders of opposition parties in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What are your impressions?

[Dodik] Just as the SNS is not renouncing, and never will, the Serb Republic, they are not renouncing their own state. Part of their opposition, primarily the Union of [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Social Democrats, is committed to the normalization of relations and the establishment of cooperation, particularly in the economy, as soon as possible between the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The former communists led by Nijaz Durakovic are closer in their views to the SDA than to the left.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Maric] The alliance from the previous elections, the SDS, the HDZ, and the SDA are now not even on speaking terms. Why has the end of the war not reconciled them?

[Dodik] This state of affairs suits them best. The SDA is using the SDS to intimidate the Muslims, the SDS is intimidating the Serbs with the return of the SDA and the HDZ to Serb ethnic territory, and the HDZ is "protecting" the Croats from the Serb and Muslim sides. They are simply counting on winning the elections by stirring up fear and hatred.

[Maric] The core of the SNS consists of independent deputies in the Serb Republic people's assembly. Why are the Serb Republic authorities calling you traitors and mercenaries in the state media?

[Dodik] We stood by the Serb people and the SDS as their strongest party, when we realized that Bosnia-Herzegovina was falling apart and that someone was planning that the Serb people should come out of this as losers. Because of the SDS's unrealistic policies, in 1994 we formed the opposition. The Serb Republic authorities, that is, the SDS, accepted what we had been calling for all along. However, to avoid admitting its mistakes and thus being held responsible for them, it declared the independent deputies criminals, CIA agents, and so on. The people, fortunately, know very well that this is not true and that all the major crime in the Serb Republic comes under the protection of the state, since most of the participants in it are prime ministers and deputy prime ministers of former governments, ministers, and top-ranking party officials.

[Maric] What does the SNS expect from the elections?

[Dodik] We will not win, but we will be an important force in the new Serb Republic assembly. Our assessment is that no party will get the overall majority needed to form the government on its own. A coalition will rule and we will be in it. The SDS will not.

[Box, p 2]

Pressure

[Maric] The opposition parties, particularly the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, are not being allowed to hold their promotion rallies in better and bigger halls and opposition activists are also getting beaten up. Do such activities help the SDS or the opposition?

[Dodik] With such activities the authorities again show their real criminal face. Among other things, they are showing that they believe more in the power of their public and secret repression apparatus than in the strength of their political program. The SDS and its leadership have obviously forgotten that good authorities serve the people, but they want the people to serve them. That is why I repeat: The SDS will not win the elections.

[Box, p 2]

Regionalism

[Maric] Why do the Serb Republic authorities declare every attempt at regional organizing separatism?

[Dodik] The regional organization of the Serb Republic is necessary because of its geography, so to speak. Why should a man from Trebinje travel to Banja Luka to get some document and why should someone from Banja Luka go all the way to Pale for some document? The authorities do not want to be decentralized and the state leadership does not want to let go of any power, so it tells the Herzegovina people that the Krajina people are against them and the Semberija people are told that the Romanija people cannot stand them. That is nonsense. It is an attempt by the authorities to hold everything in its hands.

B-H: Magazine Banned by Serb Authorities Resumes Publication

AU2504101696 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 96 p 14

[Article by R. Kovacev : "EKSTRA MAGAZIN Again"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bijeljina EKSTRA MAGAZIN is being published on a regular basis again. After being prohibited for a year, the destiny of the magazine and of the press in the Serbian Republic in general was—as a kind of promotion in the "second series"—discussed in a news conference at the International Press Center yesterday.

Jovica Petkovic, the manager and owner of EKSTRA MAGAZIN (EM), recalled the decree issued by the Serbian Republic's Information Ministry in March 1995 about the prohibition of the magazine. It was prohibited on the basis of the regulation about the mass media in times of direct danger of war. It could perhaps be said that someone analyzed 10 EM issues and concluded that "a certain number of EM articles opposed the principles of the struggle for liberation of the Serbian People!"

The Court Passed a Conscientious Decision

Sensationalism, manipulation of facts, misuse of reporters' freedom, and the absence of professionalism were statements used to qualify the magazine, which—this is only "logical"—was followed by its prohibition. The accusation that EM "decided to further negative

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

phenomena with which the leadership and the people of the Serbian Republic were confronted," indicated the strong pressure and persecution reproters would face, so that the prohibition of the paper can be considered an inevitable consequence.

The Supreme Court of the Serbian Republic adopted the complaint lodged by the editors of the magazine and established that there was not a single proof that could show that the magazine did not serve the defense of the country. The Information Ministry—as the Court established—overstepped its powers and proved that it was not acquainted with laws on mass media. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Council of Europe Votes To Admit Croatia

LD2404112796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Report by correspondent Vera Tomasek from Strasbourg]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatia has been admitted to the Council of Europe as a full-fledged member. This has been decided by the European parliamentarians by a majority of votes. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Talks With FRY on Transport Links Viewed

AU2404182796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by Mladen Jambrovic: "Belgrade Blackmails Without Trump Cards"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Negotiations on the normalization of traffic and telecommunications between the Republic of Croatia and the "FRY" have started and have been suspended several times already, because the Yugoslav negotiators' requests were completely unacceptable to the Croatian side. The same happened during their last meeting in Belgrade on 16 April.

The positions are, as we can see, still the initial ones: It is in the best interest of both countries to reestablish normal road, rail, and air traffic; open the oil pipeline; and normalize telecommunications. As far as we know, the Yugoslavs have no objection to normalizing road and rail traffic, much less to reestablishing the oil pipeline, but they do not want to normalize air traffic; this is because of their apparently arrogant attitude and the mistakes of their civilian air traffic administrative bodies.

Air Borders

We have to look back to explain the whole case. Before the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, there were two Flight Information Regions [FIR], one in Zagreb and one in Belgrade, with areas of responsibility precisely determined and noted in international publications. The border between the two FIRs was drawn from Donji Miholjac, then west of Sarajevo, over Makarska and over the Adriatic Sea. After its liberation, naturally, Croatia asked for the FIRs to be revised according to the state borders. However, unlike continental and maritime borders, the air borders were not recognized simultaneously with the international recognition of Croatia and its membership in the UN and other international organizations. Like every continent, Europe has a document, called the European Airline Navigation Plan [EANP], which comprises all documents on borders, navigation points, air routes, etc., and the procedure necessary to change the EANP is very strict and extensive. It requires agreement on any solution to controversial issues. It means that, if any of the states in question should object, the Council of the International Civil Airlines Organization [ICAO] has to accept the objection and ask the parties to come to an arrangement. Following the procedure, the "FRY," that is, its administrative bodies, objected to altering the area of jurisdiction of the Croatian Flight Control Administration and the previous air borders being revised according to the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia.

First, Second Mistakes

That was their first mistake, because their objections were of a general nature and without any legal basis, instead of accurate and expert. The ICAO organized three meetings, to which both parties were summonned, but the Yugoslav delegation did not bother to show up, thinking that "nothing can be held against them" and that they could delay the process forever. That was their second mistake. Asad Kotaite, chairman of the ICAO Council, decided that the international airlines were under too much strain, so he accepted the suggestion of the Croatian side. Thus the Republic of Croatia had its air borders included in the EANP. Legally, that is the end of the story, since no objection to such a decision is possible according to international regulations.

We should stress that, during the entire war, the international airspace over the "FRY" was excluded from UN sanctions, which brought the state budget of our neighbor state more than $500 [figure as published] as a result overflight fees. Since the matters of the airspace of the former Yugoslavia are now settled according to international law and reducing expenses are the only financial guidelines for airlines, opening airlanes over Croatia (especially in the south) would cut the state budget income of the "FRY." Therefore they, unable to do anything else or dispute the decisions of the ICAO, oppose the opening of the southern airlane.

No-Fly Zone Over Previaka?

However, the Croatian side should not worry about this, since we have all the facts and trump cards, and the Yugoslav administrative bodies for civil airlines are very much to be thanked for that. Namely, the Yugoslav side is concentrating on reestablishing road and rail traffic, because those could mean a new source of income. The Croatian side should not agree—and it seems they will not—to partial solutions to normalize traffic, but should insist on an overall solution. Everybody knows and understands this. However, there is the less widely known fact—and those who can read aeronautical maps

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

can see it—that Croatia can completely block the Yugoslav route to Italy from the south. According to valid aeronautical maps, most of the Podgorica-CRAYE [expansion unknown] point-Brindisi airlane is in Croatian airspace. Should the airline authorities of the "FRY" want to alter it, that is, move it toward Albania, they would have to start the same procedure with the international organizations, and Croatia can, and must, until the problem of normalizing traffic is solved, object and thus block the process. Moreover, Croatia can declare a no-fly zone over Prevlaka, which means prohibiting all flights, and thus make instrument landings at Tivat Airport impossible and completely exclude the airport from the airlane system during bad weather. Tourism at the Montenegro coast would be directly affected.

Croatia can do all the things mentioned and is inclined to do them, we think, should the Yugoslav side stick to their inflexible attitude. Croatia can also afford to wait, because its situation is clear, while Belgrade is in a hurry and will become frantic with the international community, because of their interests, increasing the pressure to normalize traffic in this region.

Croatia: Official on Ethnic Structure of Srem-Barania

LD2504063496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0023 GMT 25 Apr 96

[By Djordje Vukmirovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belisce, April 24 (TANJUG)—Croatia is against Eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Srem (Srem-Barania region) being populated by Serb refugees, a ranking Croatian official said Wednesday.

Ivica Vrkic, Croatian government representative in Eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Srem, told a news conference that Zagreb did not accept the change of the national structure in the region.

In this connection, Vrkic said, 'only the pre-war demographic balance in the region can be a guarantor of a stable border with Serbia.'

The region is situated between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and is currently under a one-year U.N. administration whose information section organised the news conference.

The region is the only part of the once U.N.-protected Republic of Serb Krajina, proclaimed by Serbs in Croatia in 1991 after Croatia launched its war of secession from the former Yugoslavia, that has not been occupied by Zagreb.

More than 250,000 Serbs fled before Zagreb's offensives against Serb Krajina launched in May and August 1995, with only a smaller number of them finding shelter in Eastern Slavonia.

The majority of them, about 170,000 people, fled to Yugoslavia, while about 70,000 found shelter in Serb territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Vrkic said Croatia would insist after the expiry of the U.N. mandate in the region that only those who had lived in the region before Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991 be allowed to vote in elections.

He said the issue was yet to be solved of where Serbs who had come to Eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Srem from other parts of Croatia and who wanted to settle down in the region were going to exercise their right to vote.

He said Croatia was prepared to work on creating the conditions for Serbs' return to other parts of Croatia, but said that would depend on how fast Croatia's rule would be established in Eastern Slavonia, Barania and Western Srem.

Out of about 20,000 Serb refugees' requests that they be allowed to return home, the Zagreb regime has dealt with fewer than 2,000.

Before Croatia launched its war of secession in 1991, more than 600,000 Serbs lived in Croatia, accounting for about 13 percent of its population.

Zagreb's goal is that all Croats return to their houses and that all Serbs who wish to take Croatia's citizenship be represented in Croatia's state bodies in keeping with its laws, Vrkic said.

Vrkic said the repatriation of refugees would not be based on reciprocity.

He said no conditions would be created for the return of Serbs until the fate was determined of about 1,300 Croats who had gone missing in Vukovar, a town in Eastern Slavonia that was the sight of several-month fighting between Croatian paramilitary troops on one side, and local Serbs and the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army, on the other.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: Intelligence Chief Discusses Coastal Strategy

AU2504112996 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 22 Apr 96 pp 16-18

[Interview with Rear Admiral Davor Domazet, head of the GSHV Intelligence Administration, by Ratko Peter: "We Are in Full Control of the Adriatic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rear Admiral Davor Domazet has been at the head of the Intelligence Administration of the GSHV [General Headquarters of the Croatian Army] for four years now. He was born in Sinj, where he completed his primary school education and attended secondary school of mathematics and natural sciences, and then graduated at the Naval Academy in Split, Command Staff School of Tactics and Operational Command, and the School of War and Strategic Studies.

He has studied various military doctrines, written a lot, and published expert works in all fields of military activity, especially from NATO doctrine: air-and-ground battles, in-depth strikes, and naval strategy.

During the war in Slovenia he fled from Belgrade, where he was attending Military School, came to the National Guard, and discharged many offices throughout the Liberation War. He has participated in all the HV [Croatian Army] military operations, and since the end of 1992 he has been the head of the Intelligence Administration of the GSHV, a position he still occupies.

All this provides sufficient reason to interview him, but, nevertheless, the presentation of the new tactical observation system on the Adriatic is the main reason for it.

[Peter] Before the main topic of our conversation, can you just look back at some articles in the media caused by the personnel changes in the HV, on the alleged tacit conflict, and even a split between those officers who have come from the "JNA" [Yugoslav People's Army] and those who have made their name during the Liberation War?

[Domazet] The personnel solutions tell you a totally different story. There is no split. If there was one, there would have been neither Operation Flash nor Storm, nor would any other Croatian Army operation have been feasible. In such complex operations there must be a symbiosis of all the factors, particularly the human ones. However, there is something else, and that is the question of whether a man can or cannot adapt to a situation, or disagree regarding the cognition of how contemporary operations are to be conducted. Operation Storm showed that the war is conducted in a third and/or fourth dimension. There can be differences in approach, but the final result simply denies such claims.

[Peter] What is the significance of this new tactical system for observation on the Adriatic?

[Domazet] The presentation of the new tactical system of observation on the Adriatic is under way, and the significance of the presentation of that project is manifold. If everybody wants Croatia not to be only a seaside, but also a sea country, that includes Croatia's participation in and influence over the whole economy at sea and the projection of its own force from the sea and across the sea. The Adriatic is a part of the Mediterranean, where the sea is largly pulled into the European land mass. Almost two-thirds of that sea belongs to Croatia, both as a part of the state—internal sea waters and territorial waters, or as a part of the economic belt. A large part of Central Europe is oriented toward the Adriatic precisely through Croatia, and therefore Croatia has a specific strategic position. The countries of Central Europe, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Switzerland, and even the southern part of Germany, or, on the other hand, Ukraine, not to mention Bosnia-Herzegovina, are interested in an economic breakthrough to the Adriatic. That is one more proof that Croatia does not belong to the Balkans in terms its geostrategic position. When it comes to dangers from the sea, these do not necessarily have to hold military features, because it could also be a question of jeopardy to tourism, which is very important to us, or, on the other hand, endangering the sea routes or, in general, the endangering of the coastal area. Therefore, to coordinate procedures control is necessary, and again, one needs information for that. The tactical system of observation presented is only the beginning of a comprehensive command and intelligence system, that is, a system of command, control, understanding, and intelligence data. So, the information becomes the essence, because one can detect a phenomenon, interpret it, and determine the best way to face it, or how to respond to it. Since all the sea communications go from Otranto and along the whole Croatian coast of the Adriatic, it is necessary to control, that is, prevent all that could endanger security in any sense. If it is military security that is endangered, a military factor will face it, if it is "civilian," it will be opposed or responded to with other means, like the police, naval rescue service, fire brigade, ecological protection.

As it is a tactical observation system, the purpose of which is mainly the control of the economic belt, an additional part is under construction so that it can have operational depth for military needs, that is, to control the access to the Adriatic and Otranto and for complete control of the whole Adriatic Sea. It is necessary because it is considered that the operational

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

depth at sea is greater than 100 kilometers, or some 50 miles, as we sailors like to put it.

[Peter] Can you tell us more specifically about the significance of that system, particularly in the context of the peacetime development we are entering?

[Domazet] In this way a large part of the Adriatic is being placed under control, as I have already mentioned, the traffic, security of navigation, ecological security, the general protection of the coastal area, but a more significant change for us is the one this system offers to the Croatian Army. Recently, it has often been said that Croatia wanted the systems to be compatible with Western ones, to allow for speedy integration.

When one analyzes the systems each NATO member has, it is immediately apparent that no two members have the same organization of brigades, the same number, the same weapons, the same kind of weapons, but they function very well when together. All maintain their national features and are adequate for an appropriate national strategy. Unification is realized at the level of command and intelligence systems, that is, by processing the information on all levels of command, so that a decision can be made quickly and dispatched to the units. In our case, that means that Croatia will keep everything good created during the Liberation War, and through the development of the command and intelligence system it will be able to take part in NATO integration immediately, or some other Western-type integration, while simultaneously maintaining the structure of our own features determined by our national strategy, with the least means spent. Command and intelligence systems, apart from place, time, one's own forces, and the enemy's forces, are the new factor of modern warfare. Nowadays the conduct of military operations is within the field of command and intelligence systems. So, based upon real time information, one picks an appropriate means to achieve the objective, which has a major influence upon the enemy's psyche. Those system have become decisive, and precisely today, by the presentation of the Tactical System of Observation we are witnessing the beginning of such endeavors. Today it is the Navy, then the air space will follow, and finally the ground, and all this together will make an integrated command and intelligence system at a strategic level, where one will constantly be able to detect and recognize the form of danger, and simultaneously be able to respond to that danger.

[Peter] What is the significance of the Adriatic in the geopolitical sense, particularly in the context of our neighbors?

[Domazet] The geopolitical significance of the Adriatic is obvious also from the fact that our southern neighbor has chosen the seizing of a large part of our sea as one of his strategic objectives. Apart from that first objective, the second most important was the Danube. So, the whole strategy was based upon snatching the sea and fresh waters from Croatia. Why? It is because Serbia thinks of itself as a "surrounded" country, and that "surroundedness" is the consequence of the fact that Serbia has no sea. As there are only two ways to the sea—one to the Aegean Sea, which is not impossible to realize, and the other one to the Adriatic, which is possible if Serbia wins the war against Croatia, and since Serbia has lost that war, it is only left with Montenegro as a possibility to realize that diminished strategic objective of gaining access to the Adriatic. To achieve that it is necessary to cancel any kind of statehood for Montenegro. That is where all the stories about Prevlaka come from. In our case, that means Serbia could jeopardize maritime transport in the Adriatic if it manages to gain a length of some 50 miles of Montenegrin coast.

As a marine country, Croatia must have freedom at sea. With its well-indented coast, with a coefficient of indention of 9.8 it is hard to put it at risk, but it is possible to threaten the accesses and the entrance into the Adriatic. There is not only a military threat. With relatively small forces, one can threaten Croatia's economy, ecology, and its priceless cultural heritage, so the defense against this threat must be comprehensive.

[Peter] You have talked mostly about Serbia and Montenegro. What is the situation with our northern neighbors, Italy and Slovenia? The Slovenes are allegedly preparing to buy some missile-equipped warships.

[Domazet] The situation is completely different with our northern neighbors because, as has already been mentioned, the Adriatic is indented deeply into the land mass, so that Croatia controls the whole northern Adriatic from the Istrian Peninsula and Kvarner Islands, and from Savudrija, Croatia controls the whole Trieste Bay, all the way down to Ancona.

There should not be any unclarified matters with Slovenia, because its potential does not, and cannot, represent a naval power, despite announcements of the purchase of some warships. In contemporary naval operations it is unjustified and purposeless to deploy warships on a very narrow and closed-sea territory as possessed by Slovenia, and the deployment and sailing itself would demand huge defense forces, so that such a system would be irrational. Otherwise, those ships are very expensive, so even if there are any plans for their purchase, it will take a lot of time for that to happen in reality, and for them to appear in Slovene territorial waters.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Regarding Italy, it controls a large part of the Adriatic, however, nevertheless, smaller than the one controlled by Croatia. Since the resources of the Italian part of the Adriatic have been exhausted and ecologically threatened, Italy is orienting to the Ionian and Tyrrhenian seas. After all, Italy will have less and less importance proportionately to Croatia's stronger and stronger development as a maritime country. Concretely, it means that communications should be established between Zagreb and Rijeka as soon as possible, and further toward Central Europe.

[Peter] The significance of Prevlaka has once again come into the focus of interest. What is the military and strategic significance of Prevlaka?

[Domazet] Let us remind ourselves, in the wider region of Prevlaka, including Sutorina, too, there was a front line and there were bunkers in Napoleon's time, which in itself speaks of the significance of that part of coast and control over it. If we get back to the thesis that the strategic objective of Serbia has been to obtain access to the Croatian part of the sea, then it is clear why they have done all they could to isolate Montenegro from Croatia, since the objective of conquest has not been achieved. They have been trying to achieve that by deploying almost the whole Navy of the "Army of Yugoslavia," thus to change the ethnic structure of Boka, and to link the whole area, including Prevlaka, with eastern Herzegovina. In that way Montenegro would be isolated from Croatia, so that that is primarily the strategic importance of Prevlaka. The second half of the same scenario is separating Montenegro from Albania. The methods are the same, so that is why the command of the 2d Army and the 2d Corps of that army are in Podgorica, and there is Radovce military ground, 12 kilometers to the north of Podgorica, and the preparations and planning of the blueprints for the military sea harbor Valdanos near Ulcinj are under way. If one adds the largest military ground in the area of Golija-Pester, which controls Montenegro from the north, then it is clear that it is the same scenario that was applied to Croatia, by which Montenegro is to be isolated, Serbianized by a change of ethnic structure, its statehood destroyed by political means, and the overall result would be Serbia's access to the sea.

It is clear that every [geographical] point has its military importance. The more a point stands out, in our case the more to the south it is, the greater its importance. Prevlaka is to be regarded in that sense. I regard Prevlaka as a point from which one can control Otranto and the access to the Adriatic. Moreover, it is an area between two states, by which a third is disabled in realizing its expansionist aspirations.

[Peter] What information do you have on the strength of the Yugoslav Navy? How respectable is it as a force, and is it a force at all? Have they made any progress regarding equipment, staff, and modernization?

[Domazet] Equipment is a necessity, but not the only condition for a naval power. There has been no technical modernization with them and their power has been constantly diminishing, so that the thesis simply does not stand of a naval force based upon the equipment and technical resources of the former Yugoslav Navy. They possess a certain number of operational ships and submarines, only 25 to 30 percent of what they had early in 1992, but which, in a larger conflict at sea, and with the application of their tactical principles, would not yield any results. Having a rocket salvo as old as a middle-aged man, or submarines that one is not sure will emerge after submerging, does not represent strength, but can represent a threat. Apart from the problems that arise from the fact that they are technologically obsolete, there are two important factors that have influenced the weakening of that navy's strength. The first is lack of quality personnel, and the second is the inability to technically maintain their combat systems, for which they do not have an infrastructure. They do not even have an appropriate harbor, so the preservation of their forces at sea has also been made more difficult. All of these are reasons why the army of Yugoslavia's navy cannot represent a military power in the long run, they cannot put us at risk, but in a low-level conflict they could keep threatening us.

[Peter] You have mentioned the Danube. Although reintegration is coming closer, that area is still in Serb hands. What do you know about the other side? There are rumors about the Serbs moving out of some areas.

[Domazet] Would I be the head of an intelligence service if I did not know as much as I should know about our adversary? After all, our operations have shown that the Intelligence Service works well. We control the situation entirely, but we cannot talk about everything publicly. One thing is sure: The Serbs in Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube River basin] understand that the Croatian Podunavlje is a part of Croatia and that this region will be reintegrated into the Republic of Croatia. Operation Storm showed them that it is vain to oppose a military force that can carry out an operation in line with the most recent criteria known in warfare.

Peaceful reintegration is a process without the use of military force, and it must take longer. Some are moving out, particularly in the area between the Drava and Bosut rivers where this migration is intensive; however unlike Baranja, where the movement is insignificant, probably because of the intention to change the ethnic structure

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

more significantly, which should serve as a reason for insisting upon some political concessions for Baranja within Croatia.

The resources of the "Army of Yugoslavia" and 11th Corps have been withdrawn into the territory of "FRY," the majority of local "political structures" have also left that area. They have been trying to disguise a part of the military troops in police uniforms, to keep some of them in reserve as armed civilians, but all those endeavors have yielded no results.

[Box, p 17]

[Peter] What does arrival into the Croatian Podunavlje mean in the military sense?

[Domazet] There is no European country that has access to the two main navigable waterways in Europe—the Adriatic and the Danube. That is the greatest geostrategic value of Croatia. Therefore the Serbs, too, in the plans I have mentioned, envisaged where to attack. But not only that. Our arrival in Podunavlje essentially strengthens Croatia's defensive ability, because it creates the possibility of basing defense upon prevention, which is very important for the affirmation of our eastern borders.

Croatia: Slavonia Serbs Elect New Leader, List 'Tasks'

LD2304182996 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1657 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 23 Apr (SRNA-FONET)—The first constituent meeting of the regional assembly held in Vukovar today dismissed the current members of the council of the Srem-Baranja region by a decision of 47 to 6. They also proclaimed null and void the decisions of this council that had until now been in force, Dragan Petrovic reports for FONET from Vukovar.

With a declaration adopted by the assembly today—until elections are held in the municipalities of Beli Manastir, Vukovar, Dalj, Mirkovci, and Tenja—Goran Hadzic, the first war president of the Republic of Serb Krajina and current member of the Srem-Baranja region negotiating team, was elected as new president of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem.

Borivoje Zivanovic, an economist from Beli Manastir, was elected assembly president; Djordje Calosevic of Dalj, deputy president; and Jovanka Momcilovic, a lawyer from Beli Manastir, was elected assembly secretary.

Vojislav Stanimirovic, president-designate of the executive council of the Srem-Baranja region, will be forming the executive council of the region in the next few days, which will consist of experts from the area.

The newly proclaimed regional executive council will carry out a number of tasks that include:

—the prevention of crime;

—the emigration of the population from this region;

—care for refugees from Krajina to the territory of the FRY;

—the establishment and development of civilian government bodies that will fully cooperate with international institutions and the UN Transitional Administration for eastern Slavonia [UNTAES] in accordance with the provisions of the Erdut agreement.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: East-West Dilemma in Defense Policy Analyzed

AU2404093496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 20 Apr 96 p 11

[Commentary by Saso Ordanoski: "To NATO With Russian Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chosen words of praise with which the president of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Kiro Gligorov, during his recent visit to Zagreb, addressed the Croat Army for its struggle against the "aggressor"—certainly represent a diplomatic error that is damaging sensitive Macedonian-Yugoslav interstate relations. It is not because we can agree or disagree with the assessments, but because even when Gligorov was meeting Milosevic and when we were violating the embargo against Serbia—in order to survive, of course!—nobody was forcing us to judge from a presidential level about who was guilty for the Third Balkan War. (God damn it, we were even less forced to insert our nose into Taiwan-China dispute!).

However, since it has been our president's practice, at least in the past, never to say anything without good reason and without previously calculating the risk, particularly because Gligorov's recent words in the style "I am talking to you, but I want the daughter-in-law to hear" are being multiplied, it is worth going back to the entire episode that took place in Zagreb.

So, after praising the "courage, strength, and vision" of the Croat Government and his counterpart Tudjman in the creation of the Croat Army which "demonstrated that Croatia is not only capable of defending itself, but can also represent an important military factor in this part of the world," one's attention is drawn to our president's plea on behalf of our Army.

For Mr. Gligorov spoke about "Macedonia's cooperation with many European and non-European states on the plan of organization of the army, education of the staff, and all other issues on which the construction of a modern army depends and its compatibility with all those armies that have been lucky enough to live in a common military pact."

Well defined, particularly concerning the accents on "all the other issues" and the "compatibility" of the Macedonian Army with the common military pact.

At approximately the same time, during his tour in the Nordic countries, [Foreign] Minister Frckovski helped us understand why Gligorov was insisting in Zagreb on speaking about our own and the Croat Army. In Stockholm, while underlining Macedonia's first international priority for joining NATO, Frckovski said that "Russia's resistance is great" to our intention, adding that "Macedonia is worried by the Russian presence in the region."

The mosaic related to the priority of Macedonia's foreign-political and security question became complete after Mr. Nikola Popovski, a member of parliament from the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], had asked whether Macedonia's intention to purchase arms from the Czech Republic "makes our country closer or more distant to NATO."

[Defense] Minister Handziski answered this question in parliament by saying that the origin "of the military equipment is not a precondition for joining NATO," and during MTV [Macedonian Television] broadcast, when he was confronted with Frckovski's statements in Stockholm, he calmed the public by saying that by "joining the NATO umbrella," Macedonia is solving nearly all its security problems and that we have no reason to fear Russia.

(It is a known fact that a former Macedonian defense minister has published a book, which also received an award, in which he advocated independence as a foreign-political perspective for Macedonia).

So, slowly but surely, we are approaching a veiled subject in Macedonia, which could be summed up in the following dilemma: Since the technology and machines of Macedonia's influential economic entities are of a Russian origin, since the future pipeline will supply us with Russian energy, will we increase our chances for joining NATO and the European Union if we equip our Army with Russian arms? Will the long-term dependence on Russian spare parts, experts, and Russian goodwill (all 'haraso'—well, in Russian) strengthen our strategic security (and other) position in the region? President Yeltsin, at the beginning of April, caused political chaos with our neighbor when he made a statement in which he declared that Bulgaria "might wish" to join the reconstruction of the Soviet Union, thus deepening the gap of intolerance (but also various strategic views on Bulgaria's future) between President Zhelev and Prime Minister Videnov.

Yeltsin did not mention us in public. Perhaps we are too small to be given such importance. Are we perhaps "easier" objects of persuasion? However, while we are waiting for the appointment of the first Russian ambassador to Macedonia, a few months ago Russian military attache Mr. Gromov arrived in our country. Macedonia's mass media announced this, some even commented it. However, it was not published that this colonel with an appropriate surname [Gromov: Thunder] was last year expelled from the Russian Embassy in Washington and proclaimed a 'persona

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

non grata' because of "activities incompatible with his diplomatic status!" (We were told in the Russian Embassy here that they did "not have such information in the Embassy.") With the recent arrival of two more Russian diplomats in Skopje, whose specialty is not always compatible with good manners and diplomacy, the experts here say that the Russian intelligence team in Skopje's Embassy is one of the best, perhaps even the best in the region.

A friend, an expert in byzantinism,—and he has a better knowledge of these matters than I do—says a discreet, but a strong recommendation has been sent to the Americans about the Russian position in Macedonia. Yes, I say, but the Americans here, contrary to the Russian diplomat, have deployed 500 troops with full military equipment and commanding staff, accompanied by all necessary services. It is true, my friend persists, but the Russians have been spinning their webs in Macedonia since the days of the ORHANA [Russian Czar's Intelligence Service], and at present they have a whole battalion engaged in the construction of the gas pipe through Macedonia... Oops, I was caught by surprise, I have never looked at it from this point of view. I say—you are suffering from the familiar Balkan syndrome, that is, you see plots everywhere. You may be right, my friend concludes, but do not forget that the president was fired at in Macedonia, and this is definitely a plot.... (We then change the subject: For instance, the manager of the Bulgarian "Multigroup" office in Skopje was murdered in Sofia.)

So, if we go back to the beginning of this text, it may not be difficult to conclude that in spite of some unskilled diplomacy, President Gligorov is still in good shape when, speaking about the "spring in our town," he sends greetings and congratulations to all necessary addresses, here at home and abroad.

FYROM: Frckovski Says Succession Rights Not Given Up

AU2404191596 Skopje MIC in English 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "We closed the last open question on mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with all our neighbors. The Agreement on normalization of relations between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and FR Yugoslavia also regulated the questions of the political-legal continuity, succession and sets a global timing by noting a list of sectors on the normalization of the relations and cooperation in all fields of life. The relations are established at ambassadorial level, and the continuity—succession—is settled in line with the stances of the Badinter Commission and the international community that the SFRY is no longer one entity. That is a very important political moment for us, and it is also important for the establishment of a legal framework for the settlement of other questions surrounding the realization of the succession. FRY backed down from its claim that it is the only successor for the first time, taking the stance that RM [Republic of Macedonia] has the same status. By this, we got the maximum we could ask for." This is how Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski explained the recently signed Agreement on the regulation of relations and the strengthening of cooperation between RM and FRY, speaking in front of the members of the Foreign politics commission with the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia about the current foreign-political activities of the state.

The minister cleared up some dilemmas in the public—that by signing the Agreement, Macedonia would automatically be giving up its succession, or that it has backed down from the multilateral settlement of this question. He explained that the fact that the Agreement states that the parties will settle the question of succession by agreement does not mean that anything is decided beforehand, but it only confirms that all forms of violent and forceful settlement of the problem are excluded, and that other rules of the game will be followed. He confirmed that exactly these days, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina continued their coordinated and individual campaign on a bilateral plan with countries that have assets of the former Yugoslavia. The minister emphasized that the Government has already started with the realization of parts of the Agreement, which will have to be ratified by both parliaments, adopting also an appropriate law, whereby he emphasized the work of the State commission for demarcation of the border line, and not the frontier, as it is already known.

Speaking of the current relations with the neighbors, Frckovski said that at the moment, they are under the influence of the announced and cancelled visit of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski to Skopje. "I will not comment the reasons for the cancellation of the visit, but I will say that on our part, there is good will to overcome that, to put it this way, silly dispute and to hold this meeting at a time when Bulgaria deems it appropriate," Frckovski said.

He mentioned the anticipated visit of the Albanian Prime Minister Aleksandar Mexi to Macedonia and the planned signing of four important agreements in relation to the border. He still assesses the relations with Greece as very favorable, underlining that the dispute over the name remains and the Macedonia's stance on this issue is unchanged.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Crvenkovski Comments on Relations With FRY

AU2404190896 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Interview with FYROM Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski by Dusko Petrovic in Skopje; date not given—recorded; Crvenkovski speaks in Macedonian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petrovic] How do you assess relations as they are now and will be in the future between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the FRY, in view of the Belgrade agreement on the normalization of relations between the two neighboring countries?

[Crvenkovski] What makes me particularly happy is the fact that the agreement itself contains not only the stipulation on the establishment of diplomatic relations, but also the fact that there is a feeling there of goodwill for the development of relations in all spheres of life, in the spheres of economy, trade, science, and culture. What I think is very important is that the agreement is implemented through concrete meetings at various levels between representatives of various institutions. When we speak of economic cooperation, there is a basic principle: Economic cooperation is possible when both sides' interests are involved. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia and the FRY, the interests are evident. After all, the business communities of both countries know each other's markets well. The structures of our economies are largely not competitive, but rather complementary. That is why I think that the interest is there, and what the two governments should do now is create the legal framework to reduce the feeling of risk-taking in the business communities of the two countries when they sign trade and economic arrangements. This means that agreements on economic cooperation should be signed, such as an agreement on the protection of investments, an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation, and an agreement to establish direct and normal payment operations between the two countries. The conditions for free initiatives from the representatives of companies in the two countries should be created so that they can put the agreement in practice.

[Petrovic] The confidence-building measures among the nations and countries in the Balkans contribute to the greatest degree to the strengthening of peace, and to their economic prosperity. What are your views, please, on the economic cooperation in the Balkans?

[Crvenkovski] I hope that the establishment of peace and the strengthening of the peace process will create completely different conditions that will lead to the normalization of relations among all the states, primarily in the political sphere, but of course also economically. I also expect that the normalization of relations in the region will reduce the risk that has existed up to this point for foreign investors. I think that this would be another advantage for all the countries in the region, as we are all in a period of transition, in a period of reform, where foreign capital would be welcome.

[Petrovic] Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister.

FYROM: Bulgarian Foreign Minister Postpones Visit

AU2304174396 Skopje MIC in English 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At the request of the Bulgarian side, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski postponed his two-day visit to the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] yesterday, which was scheduled for April 24 and 25.

The chief of the Department on Southeast Europe in the Bulgarian ministry Strakhil Chervenkov told NOVA MAKEDONIJA that the visit is postponed because of the "more frequent anti-Bulgarian writing in the Macedonian media which does not create the atmosphere for a ministerial visit." The second reason, according to Chervenkov, is that the "suggested formulas for settling the obstacles in the relations are not constructive," MAKPRESS reports.

FYROM: Postponement of Pirinski Visit Criticized

AU2404201396 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Milan Banov: "Diplomatic Scandal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the recent incident near the Rozenski Monastery [in Bulgaria], when police prevented members of OMO [United Macedonian Organization] "Ilinden" from paying their respects at Jane Sandanski's [Macedonian revolutionary] grave, another unpleasant speciality has arrived from our eastern neighbor; that is, the Sofia government, which will definitely not contribute to the development of good neighborly relations. Namely, although it had been announced, agreed, and planned in detail, the two-day visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Pirinski to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was postponed just two days before the beginning of the visit. As a reason for this—and this is actually what characterizes the seldom honest Bulgarian policy toward Macedonia—there were two flimsy explanations for the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

postponement, with negative and absolutely intangible connotations.

Minister Pirinski will not be visiting our state on 24 and 25 April (these dates had been requested by the Bulgarian side) and he will not be meeting Macedonian state leaders, as Strakhil Chervenkov, head of the Southeast Europe Section of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, says, because of the "frequent anti-Bulgarian articles in the Macedonian media, which do not create the atmosphere for a ministerial visit." The second reason was that the "proposed formula for solving the obstacles in relations are not constructive."

The Republic of Macedonia has before witnessed and faced Bulgarian activities that are not compatible with diplomatic manners. However, this latest Bulgarian gaffe, which has turned into a diplomatic scandal, reveals that Sofia is a totally nonserious partner, which makes communications in line with diplomatic norms and standards difficult. Macedonia normally does not need to justify itself to its eastern neighbor and the Macedonian media do not even think of doing this, but it is still probably worth recalling that there were no "frequent anti-Bulgarian articles" at the time the visit was accepted and organized at the invitation of Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski. Chervenkov himself has declared that nothing has happened in the interim and the events near the Rozenski Monastery are not connected with the postponement of the visit. So, regarding the first explanation, it is totally invalid and is just being used as a pretext behind which neighboring Bulgaria is hiding the real reasons for its not good neighborly action. On the other hand, it is really ridiculous to make such an accusation at a time when the Bulgarian mass media are nearly every day coming up with strong animosity against Macedonia, always using every means to deny the existence of the Macedonian nation. Such provocations, which certainly do not contribute to good neighborliness or a relaxed situation in the region, are also arriving from top Bulgarian state officials. Let us recall that only a few days ago Ivan Tatarchev, the public attorney of the Republic of Bulgaria, crudely denied the existence of the Macedonian nation in their media.

As for the other reason for the postponement of the visit of Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski, that is that the "proposed formulas for solving the obstacles in relations are not constructive," it is necessary to emphasize that it has actually to do with Ljubomir Frckovski's statement in Helsinki, in which he said that Macedonia is firm that the agreements of the two states must be signed in the Macedonian and the Bulgarian languages, in line with the constitutions of the two states. Bulgaria, which is not free from the old historical errors, apparently refuses to accept this and this is why it denies "constructiveness," although a number of agreements have already been signed in the two languages. The nonsense became even greater and Sofia's attitude more absurd after we found out, unofficially, that the proposal to sign the agreements according to the constitutions of the two countries, therefore in Macedonian and Bulgarian, comes from the Bulgarian side. However, the "forgetful" Bulgarians are now pointing to this as the basic reason for postponing Pirinski's visit, which is further evidence that it is an unprincipled and nonserious partner with whom Macedonia is dealing.

At this stage, it is difficult to find out the real reason for the unprecedented diplomatic manners of neighboring Bulgaria, but, regardless of what it really is, it is certainly not honest or friendly toward our country. Who knows, perhaps everything depends on the timing and on the calculations of Pirinski's team, which decided that this was not the right time for him to visit Macedonia, now that he has a great opportunity of becoming the presidential candidate of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and of the Democratic Left. The public declaration on good neighborliness and friendship of the Bulgarian political spirit is loaded down with the Macedonian question and it has probably been decided that it can be risky for a possible presidential candidate, particularly when Macedonia has just normalized relations with the FRY as a logical consequence of Macedonian foreign policy and its basic values, the principle of equidistance to its neighbors, which certainly does not correspond to the schemes and the taste of the Sofia government.

FYROM: Czech Foreign Minister Arrives in Skopje

AU2204175396 Skopje MIC in English 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic Jozef Zielinec arrived on an official visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] yesterday. In addition to talks with his host, Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, the Czech guest will also be received by President Gligorov, Assembly Chairman Tito Petkovski, and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski.

This is the first official visit of a foreign minister from the Central European countries to Macedonia, the Macedonian Foreign Ministry announced.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: PDPA-NDP Defeated in By-Election

AU2404163796 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 24 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by I.A.: "Menduh Taci: We Would Have Won If We Had Used Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Is is possible for us to win the elections, that is if we threaten with arms or start killing people," said Menduh Taci, vice president of PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians], at yesterday's news conference of the PDPA and NDP [People's Democratic Party], alluding to the self-injury of one of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] members after this party had won the additional elections in Skopje constituency 102.

The results of the second round of the elections in 102, according to Taci, are real proof that "there cannot be democracy in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. In spite of all this, it was said at the news conference, PDPA and NDP are satisfied with the results of the additional elections.

"The PDPA-NDP candidate lost because of the 700 votes of the Bosniaks and the 750 votes of the Macedonians living in this region," according to the news conference.

Although there are theoretical chances for the PDPA-NDP candidate to win because the elections will be repeated in two voting stations, the two parties declared that they will not undertake any activities because, as they said, it was clear that the elections had been arranged.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Policeman Critically Hurt in Warsaw Bomb Explosion

LD2404141796 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1344 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 24 Apr—A policeman from the Warsaw antiterrorist brigade was injured in a bomb explosion in Warsaw today. Having undergone an emergency operation, he is now in critical condition in one of the Warsaw hospitals.

It transpires from the preliminary investigation that the policeman was injured during an attempt to defuse a bomb that was found at a car wash at the Shell gas station on Ostrobramska Street in Warsaw. The bomb went off at 1230 hours while the policeman was taking a photograph of it.

Warsaw police received a report about a bomb at 1100 hours. Many of the injured policeman's colleagues went to the hospital to donate blood for the man, who is now fighting for his life.

Poland: More Money Allocated for Forces in Bosnia

LD2404204396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski has said that Poland will be allocating a further $25 million to finance the stay of soldiers of the Polish contingent in Bosnia. During a meeting with a group of foreign reporters, the minister of national defense said that the additional sum was necessary because the costs of the operation had turned out be higher than planned. A group of 660 Polish paratroopers is part of a brigade of Nordic IFOR [Implementation Force] forces in Bosnia, whose task it is to ensure the observance of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Poland: Reaction to NATO Secretary General's Visit

WS2404125696

[FBIS Report] On 20 and 22 April, several Warsaw vernacular dailies carried reactions to the visit by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to Poland.

On 20 April, the centrist RZECZPOSPOLITA on page 29 under the "Always on Saturday" rubric ran a 500-word commentary by Kazimierz Dziewanowski, former Polish ambassador to the United States, entitled "Solana: NATO Expansion Decided." Dziewanowski notes that "even though we did not find out the date of NATO expansion (the secretary general is not authorized to set such dates on his own), we did hear a statement, which was repeated with great determination, that NATO would expand; nothing can change this decision." Then Dziewanowski goes on to discuss the internal preelection situation in Russia and the Russian approach to the issue of NATO expansion in general as factors that cause NATO to delay the process. Dziewanowski believes that "Russia's place in the European and global order will depend on Russia itself. If Russia continues to give priority to imperial prestige and if it decides to pursue policies of confrontation instead of making efforts to find a place among the wealthy and developed countries, it will lag behind as far as the economy is concerned."

On 21 April, the military POLSKA ZBROJNA daily on pages one and four ran a 650-word commentary by Maksymilian Berezowski entitled "Before NATO Opens Up." According to the journalist, "by developing direct dialogue and personal contacts soon after assuming the office of the NATO general secretary, Solana most certainly sought to ease the impatience in the 'corridor' leading to NATO." According to Berezowski, "Solana's visit was to prove that the process of NATO expansion would not be halted halfway and that it would be put into effect regardless of Russia's objections, which assume various forms—either threats or suggestions. However, it must also be said that the NATO secretary general was not authorized to state when NATO would make a binding decision on expansion. The official NATO calendar shows that this date is 'very close' (as Solana put it): In December, the Council of Ministers would determine further proceedings. Now, as I have found out from circles close to NATO, expansion should actually take place within two years." Berezowski concludes that "the visit by the NATO secretary general to Warsaw was a useful occasion to review and sum up the preparations for the expansion of the alliance; it also confirmed how greatly our readiness, as well as the situation in our country, influences Poland's image in the headquarters of the alliance."

On 20 April, the leftist TRYBUNA on page five carried a 700-word report by "DZ" and "DP" on comments by politicians on Solana's visit to Warsaw, entitled "The Subcutaneous Waiting." Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, is quoted as saying that Solana's trip to our part of Europe "explains a lot." According to him, "Solana put an unequivocal end to all of the speculation on NATO expansion. Now we already know that, within the next two years—or even, I would say, within the next 18 months—the issue of NATO's eastward expansion will be decided favorably. In this sense, the visit of the secretary general deserves the highest grade."

Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski said that the visit was "very successful." "We did not expect any spectacular decisions," he pointed out, and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

stressed that "what made a great impression on Solana was the fact that there is broad political consensus in Poland on integration with NATO."

According to Minister of State Jerzy Milewski, "the visit by the NATO secretary general to Warsaw was a perfect occasion for us to confirm our determination to join NATO and for NATO to confirm its firm willingness to open up to the countries of Central and East Europe. Mr. Solana had an opportunity to find out personally that all of the political forces in our countries are in favor of Poland's quickest possible integration with NATO. I evaluate very highly his public statements on the near-term prospect of offering NATO membership to our country. This is of great importance for our society."

Poland: Ireland Supports Polish EU Membership

LD2504113496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 25 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Irish Prime Minister John Bruton has said that his country supports Poland's aspiration to become a member of the European Union. In the second half of the year, Ireland will assume the EU chair as part of a system of rotation.

The Irish prime minister, who has started a two-day visit to Poland, said after his meeting with Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz that matters connected with Poland's wish to join the EU, the opportunities for our country to take part in the intergovernmental conference, the combating of crime—chiefly drug-related crime—and matters pertaining to nuclear security were discussed. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz stressed that this is the first visit by an Irish prime minister to our country and that the fact that Ireland will be assuming the chairmanship of the EU in a few months' time demonstrates the importance of the visit.

Poland: Defense Minister's Visit to Ukraine Previewed

WS2404125796 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 24 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak: "Minister Dobrzanski Goes to Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski is to pay an official visit to Kiev on 25-26 April at the invitation of Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov. Members of the Polish delegation include Miroslaw Cieslik, the charge d'affaires at the Polish Embassy in Kiev; Slawomir Gozdzik, director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of National Defense; Brigadier General Leszek Chyla, chief of the Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces; Colonel Franciszek Gagor, director of the DWSZ [expansion unknown]; and Colonel Boguslaw Smolski, director of the Development and Implementation Department.*

The visit is a continuation of direct contacts between the defense ministers of both states provided for within agreements reached in Solina [southeast Poland] in 1995. The ministers are to evaluate the military and political situation in East and Central Europe, and the Polish minister is to present our stance on NATO enlargement. Minister Dobrzanski and Minister Shmarov will exchange views on bilateral military cooperation and the possibilities of developing it, particularly within the Partnership for Peace program. The ministers will also discuss the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and share their experiences from the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission.

Military cooperation between our countries is good, yet its intensity is not proportional to the defense potential of both countries. The major event in bilateral relations to date was last year's visit of the Ukrainian minister to Poland. It launched a new phase in our cooperation. Cooperation in 1996 provides for 23 projects, the majority of which are contacts between military districts in the border area—the Krakow and Carpathian districts. As for science and technology, cooperation in the field of naval and air equipment is projected. A protocol on cooperation on military training is to be signed during the visit.

During his visit to Ukraine, Minister Dobrzanski will meet with President Leonid Kuchma, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, and W. Mukhin, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Standing Commission for Security and Defense. The Polish defense minister will acquaint Ukrainian politicians with the Polish stance on the future security structures in Europe and the priorities of Polish foreign policy as formulated by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will also express the will to tighten cooperation with an independent Ukraine.

Minister Dobrzanski will also deliver a lecture to the heads and students of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy on the Polish vision of a Pan-European security model; he will also lay wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Kiev and at the Monument of Polish Antiaircraft Troopers at Darnytskyy Cemetery.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: Belarusian Opposition Leader Meets With Walesa

WS2504141196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Apr 96 p 7

[Untitled report by "ROB" under the "Poland in Brief" rubric]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zyanon Paznyak, chairman of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, yesterday met with former President Lech Walesa in Gdansk. "There are no trade unions in our country, the press has been monopolized, and there is a wave of persecutions similar to that observed in Poland in the 1980's," said Paznyak. He spoke of the manifestation to take place in Minsk on 26 April to commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy. "Lukashenka has already summoned OMON forces [special purpose police units] from Moscow. I fear it might come to bloodshed." Paznyak asked Walesa to persuade Solidarity to send a protest message to Lukashenka on the curbing of democratic freedoms.

Poland: SDRP Leader: Oleksy Case Undermines Special Services

LD2404132096 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0610 GMT 24 Apr 96

[Interview with Leszek Miller, deputy chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, SdRP, and head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, URM, by correspondent Barbara Gorska]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Gorska] Good morning.

[Miller] Good morning.

[Gorska] Minister, will your party put [former Interior Minister] Andrzej Milczanowski before the State Tribunal?

[Miller] Last night the SdRP Supreme Council Presidium examined this matter, among other things. We expressed the hope that, in accordance with the announcement by Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, all of the circumstances surrounding the unfounded accusation against [former Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy would be clarified in a competent and impartial manner. On the basis of this, conclusions would be drawn and legal consequences would follow with regard to those who had inspired and organized that provocation, including putting them before the State Tribunal. The last sentence is a quote from a statement we adopted yesterday.

[Gorska] Will the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] be able to get a majority in the Sejm to support a motion for putting the minister before the State Tribunal?

[Miller] I think this will be the case because the situation is serious. Today it may look different from what it did even a few weeks ago, but please remember that in December 1995 there was talk about a crisis of the state and about the security of the state being in danger. Because these accusations have not been confirmed, the matter should not just be dropped with a shrug of the shoulders.

[Gorska] Do you think the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] will be of the same opinion and support your motion?

[Miller] Everyone who values the way of thinking that all possible conclusions should be drawn from this incident, and above all, that such a situation should not happen ever again, that never again should the special services be used against any politician—everyone who has such intentions will treat a possible motion of this kind seriously, of course, if such a motion is submitted.

[Gorska] Are you afraid, minister, that such a situation can be repeated and, for example, involve yourself?

[Miller] It can happen again to anyone because similar situations occurred many times before, both during the period of the Polish People's Republic, when the Interior Ministry was used for many purposes little connected with the law, and also after 1989.

You know, I was most astounded when reading the decision by Military Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz. When you read carefully the decision that the investigation should be dropped, a terrible picture of incompetence and lack of professionalism emerges with regard to the group of the State Protection Office [UOP] officers who started the affair. [passage omitted]

You see, when I hear that further actions can weaken the Polish special services, I think these services cannot be made any weaker than they already are. Because the material [evidence in the Oleksy case] has been disqualified by the prosecutor, this fact undermines the confidence in the Polish special services in the international arena. This means that it will now be more difficult for the Polish MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], particularly UOP [State Protection Office], to cooperate with similar services in the world.

There is also an internal context. I think it will be considerably more difficult for the Polish special services to recruit agents and informers because potential collaborators will fear cooperation with people who can act in such an unprofessional fashion. A great misfortune to the Polish special services has already happened. However, the Polish special services have been weakened by those who launched the operation and conducted it. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Gorska] Is it true, do you think, Minister, what one of the newspapers has written—that Marian Zacharski [superspy who revealed the martial law plans to U.S. intelligence] was proposed to head [former] Prime Minister Oleksy's office not by Andrzej Milczanowski but by President Aleksander Kwasniewski? This apparently has been mentioned by a PSL [Polish Peasant Party] politician.

[Miller] Jozef Oleksy told me about such a proposal. He said that the recommendation for Marian Zacharski's appointment to Jozef Oleksy's office had come from Minister Milczanowski. [passage omitted]

[Gorska] Is it really true, as the SdRP has announced in its official statement, that the Oleksy case is no more? Is it really true that the matter has disappeared inasmuch as newspapers are still reporting on nothing else but this case on their front pages? And people are not talking about anything else, either in their homes or on the street?

[Miller] I think the case is no more in the sense that the accusations against Jozef Oleksy have been fully disqualified. What remains is the matter of system solutions, which will have to go in the direction of putting up a barrier to all temptations that might emerge in the future—that Polish special services could yet again be involved in political games and used for political fighting, or against any politicians. This case still exists. One must introduce appropriate system solutions that would prevent similar situations in the future.

[Gorska] Thank you for the conversation.

[Miller] Thank you very much.

Poland: Lawyer Demands Return of Property to Kuklinski

WS2404140996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20-21 Apr 96 pp 1, 11

[Article by Danuta Frey: "Spokesman for Civil Rights: Kuklinski Is Entitled to Damages"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Piotr Dewinski, the lawyer representing Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski [Polish military officer who passed information to the United States before Martial Law was imposed in Poland in 1981] and his wife, Elzbieta, has asked the spokesman for civil rights for assistance in the retrieval of the Kuklinskis' confiscated property. Professor Tadeusz Zielinski [former spokesman for civil rights] claims that the situation that has developed is contrary to the law. The ruling on the basis of which the property was confiscated was rescinded by the Supreme Court. Despite this fact, the Kuklinskis have neither retrieved their property nor received any damages.*

Ryszard Kuklinski, now 66, who has been living in the United States since 1981, was sentenced to death by the Court of the Warsaw Military District in 1984. (As a result of an amnesty, the penalty was changed to 25 years in prison). At the same time, the court ruled for complete forfeiture of the property. In May 1995, the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court revoked that ruling, as a result of which the case returned to the Prosecutor's Office of the Warsaw Military District. The preparatory proceedings it is conducting are being supervised by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.

Dewinski suggests that the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office should take steps to ensure that Col. Kuklinski's property be returned to him. Right now the only way to do this would be to return the money equivalent of the confiscated property, in which case it would not be necessary for Kuklinski to institute legal proceedings against the State Treasury. However, both the Prosecutor's Office and the Investigation Directorate in the Office of State Protection refuse to take a stand on this issue. [passage omitted]

Poland: Minister Discusses Social Security Reform Proposals

WS2404135596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by A.F.T.: "The Social Security System; Before the Voting in the Sejm"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *In the near future, the minister of labor will propose to the government that it appoint him its plenipotentiary responsible for the reform of the social security system. Andrzej Baczkowski not only would like the information on the government's concept of the social security system to be approved by the Sejm; he believes that it would also be good if "the program received broad support" and if "agreements above political divisions were reached." The Labor Ministry proposes ending the debate on the general program and beginning a discussion on specific laws.*

Andrzej Baczkowski said at the news conference that he would hold a dialogue with the authors of the various concepts; he added, however, that very important in these talks would be simulations involving concrete figures—which will have to be taken into account before specific solutions are approved.

Baczkowski presented the ministry's position on the debate that took place in the parliament last week. Here are the issues that gave rise to controversies:

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

—The final model of the pension system, including proportions between the repartition elements and the capital elements. "The program is realistic," Baczkowski said. "We proposed a tax incentive to enable the creation of the other, capital element. Moreover, the ministry believes it is possible to gradually earmark relatively less money for premiums for repartition insurances (to reduce the premium from the projected 250 percent of the average wage to 15 or even 100 percent)."

—Whether the second, capital element of the system should be optional or obligatory. Baczkowski is of the opinion that it is impossible to ignore the opinion of 8.5 million citizens who want money from privatization to be used in the universal insurance systems. The minister added that the selected option should not go beyond the "framework of the mass enfranchisement." Money from privatization cannot support only selected people. What form of pension enfranchisement will be proposed by the government remains open.

—Prolonging women's retirement age: "The fact that women who have worked for 30 years are entitled to a retirement pension at age 55 is of fundamental importance for the pension security system," said Baczkowski, explaining that this state of affairs should be changed.

—The negotiable valorization system: "Once again, we will consider the importance of the negotiation-based mechanism (proposed in the program)." "Most probably the ministry will propose a legal indexation system." [passage omitted]

Poland: Migration, Employment of Foreigners, Tourism

WS2504081496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20-21 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Natalia Skipietrow: "We Travel More and Emigrate Less; To Poland and From Poland—To Find a Job"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Bogdan is unemployed and sometimes travels to Germany to sell cigarettes. Janusz worked in France for a few years; now he has a construction firm in Warsaw and employs Volodia from Kiev, who works "black" in Poland. Basia went to London in 1988 and decided to stay there.*

Experts of the Labor Ministry and the Institute of Social Issues at the University of Warsaw discussed work-related migrations yesterday [19 April].

We Go There

In the 1980's, more than 2 million people emigrated from Poland, primarily the young and well educated. Half of them stayed abroad longer than a year.

In 1989 as many as 280,000 people left Poland to stay abroad for a longer period of time. In the early 1990's, the number of emigrants was already six times lower, which resulted from the following: the fact that the U.S. dollar was not as attractive to Poles as it had been earlier, the changes that had taken place in Poland and no chance to receive political asylum abroad, as well as more rigorous immigration regulations in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Instead, we make short trips abroad more and more often. In 1985 fewer than 6.4 million Poles crossed the state border, whereas 10 years later this number rose to over 36 million. The Labor Ministry estimates that every year between 300,000 and 350,000 people find legal jobs abroad; half of them are seasonal workers who find a job in Germany, which is made possible by the Polish-German employment agreements.

Interest in emigration to the United States has also risen, which is proved by the popularity of the visa lottery. In 1993 Poles took 87 percent of the visas, whereas last year they submitted nearly 50,000 applications, which was six times more than the next country on the list—Ethiopia.

They Come Here

In 1995 over 11,000 foreigners from 95 countries were granted permission to work in Poland. Nearly half of them are company managers. One in five is a blue-collar worker. The biggest number of the permits were granted to Ukrainians.

The number of people who have permits is equal to the number of those who have permanent residence cards.

Approximately 100,000 worked illegally; they primarily took on seasonal jobs.

Last year Poland was visited by nearly 82 million foreigners. Approximately 10 million of them came from across the eastern border to find a job or to trade. Originally they sold goods for German marks and U.S. dollars, which they then took back home with them. For three years they have been coming here with dollars to buy goods in Poland.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: Foreign Minister Assesses Visit to Moldova

AU2404202096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu arrived home a short while ago from a two-day official visit to the Republic of Moldova.

This is the statement he made upon arrival in Bucharest:

[Begin Melescanu recording] I hope that the fact that our delegation was very large will yield results. The goal of the visit, in which I was accompanied by some of the ministers and state secretaries of the Romanian Government, was to attend the annual session of the interministerial committees for relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. As we always do, we evaluated what has been accomplished so far, we tried to emphasize what we found important, and, especially, we tried to cast a glance into the future, at what we could do next to achieve what we consider to be the joint objectives of the two countries, namely the deepening of economic integration, as well as the strengthening of our common spiritual and cultural heritage.

I would say that everything was very important. So were the talks that we held in the plenary meeting, as were some of the concrete cooperation documents signed by the ministers of health and culture and other colleagues who attended the talks.

Nevertheless, I would describe as most important that on this occasion each of the Romanian ministers had the opportunity to hold talks with his counterpart and examine several concrete projects, which range from setting up joint border checkpoints or joint railroad stations to other issues, certain common objectives, such as Moldova's participation in the future development of the Cernavoda nuclear power station, and so on.

A further issue that we tried to discuss was the improving, the amelioration, of the financing system of our cooperation. We proposed that this financing should no longer be done exclusively from Romania's budget, but rather be financed jointly, in which the Moldovan Government should also participate—although not to an equal extent—because, after all, our economic integration is an important goal for both of our countries. Above all, this new system should allow for the attraction of investment from private or international sources.

I would like to add that all these proposals and projects will be examined by our working groups and then discussed again and hopefully implemented at the next meeting of the interministerial committees, which will take place in Bucharest, probably in March or April of next year. Today's session was preceded by my official visit yesterday at the invitation of Foreign Minister Popov, a visit that was intended to emphasize the importance of our political dialogue. This dialogue will probably continue tomorrow, when President Mircea Snegur, heading an important delegation, arrives in Bucharest to attend the forum of businessmen in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. This visit allowed me to hold talks with them, learn about the viewpoints existing in Moldova with respect to Romania, and, especially, to express the firm determination of our government to support the orientations and efforts made by Moldova to continue rapprochement with Romania, as well as European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. [end recording]

Romania: DP's Roman Claims Iliescu Offers No Solutions

AU2404164396 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 19 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Democratic Party President Petre Roman "in response to Ion Iliescu's 'Clarifications' in JURNALUL NATIONAL": "Mr. Ion Iliescu Has No Solutions for the Present or the Past, Let Alone for the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To begin with, one should answer this question: Why does Mr. Ion Iliescu launch this polemic about certain past facts that are not the true topic of this year's elections? Maybe just because of that. Mr. Iliescu is currently under the pressure of the poverty in the country, of the people's poverty accumulated in the last four years mainly. This is the real topic we should talk about. Mr. Iliescu's problem, which unfortunately is not only his, but ours, too, is [one of] many troubles burdening the people, for which Mr. Iliescu also bears a direct responsibility. Mr. Iliescu has no solution for either the present or the past. The solution to these troubles and impasse cannot come from the very ones who are responsible for the situation in which we find ourselves. Therefore, once again, Mr. Iliescu has no solutions for either the present or the past, let alone the future.

I am emphasizing this because I want it to be understood that bringing up the issue of the September 1991 miners' incursion now is the theme preferred by Mr. Iliescu, not me.

Nevertheless, regarding the "gross misinterpretations and disinformation" [referred to by Iliescu in his JURNALUL NATIONAL reply], I would also like to mention one: In reference to the communique issued at the time by the Country's Supreme Defense Council [CSAT], he talks about my "laying down the mandate," and—without giving any quotes (without quota-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

tion marks)—says he was going to proceed to negotiations to put together a new cabinet.

This is a really gross distortion. If Mr. Iliescu has forgotten that document, all newspapers published it in its exact form at the time. I am now quoting from it: "President Iliescu, together with Prime Minister Petre Roman, will proceed to negotiations on forming a new government of broad democratic opening." Therefore, the laying down of my mandate has never meant my resignation. This equation is a fixed point in Mr. Ion Iliescu's scheme of arguments. I am sad to have to ascertain once again that Mr. Iliescu consistently looks beyond the facts and sometimes even in spite of them. Nevertheless, the facts are documented. I recall:

1. The government's communique [illegible]he positive conclusion of an agreement with the Jiu Valley League of Mining Trade Unions on their claims;

2. The League's communique on the cancellation of the call to strike;

3. The CSAT communique on the measures to halt the violent actions of the group of miners that have set out from the Jiu Valley;

4. The joint document, signed by President Iliescu and Miron Cozma [leader of the Jiu Valley League of Mining Trade Unions], a document which Mr. Iliescu cannot make to vanish, since it was published in all the newspapers of that time;

5. To all these documents, one should add another one of great importance, to which Mr. Iliescu does not even make a passing reference, namely the report of the Parliamentary commission of enquiry into the events of September 1991, which contains all the relevant data and depositions and proposes the necessary measures to overcome the violation of the lawful order committed in those days.

The fact that Mr. Iliescu invokes certain personal discussions inevitably leads to an impasse. For instance, in Mr. Iliescu's first reference to the resignation, he mentions certain talks held at the beginning of 1991, when, on the other hand I said that, together with several colleagues, I asked Mr. Iliescu to hold early elections, something which he refused. In his latest clarification in JURNALUL NATIONAL of 17 April 1996, Mr. Iliescu no longer refers to that moment. In a responsible discussion, one cannot choose just some of the facts, namely the ones that suit him. As the Romanian saying goes: "May God save my soul from the phony goodwill." Would it not be better to have a public debate, face to face? I am convinced that it would.

I believe that the return to the past, in order to interpret it in a more favorable or even profitable light, is a futile effort, given the fact that the country's entire population wants today a change for the better. With all due consideration for the efforts made by Mr. Iliescu in the years after the revolution, I feel it is my duty to no longer augment this sterile polemic. Instead, I should commit myself not to a disputed past, but rather to a better future.

Romania: UDMR Leader Marko Explains Policies

AU2504101796 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 18 Apr 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Anne Juganaru and Constantin Gheorghe; place and date not given: "It Is Inconceivable for Me To Exclude From the Outset Either the More Radical or the More Moderate Political Methods"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [JURNALUL NATIONAL] [Union] President Bela Marko, do you believe that Romanian society has a clear perception of what the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] represents?

[Marko] I do not believe the Romanian public sees the UDMR as a political party. No polls have been conducted on this. The UDMR has to be regarded as the representative of the ethnic Hungarians of Romania, the representative of a particular community. I could go on and on talking about the nature of our organization, as well as its particular features, which do exist, due to the fact that the UDMR is present in Parliament and occupies a relatively well defined place in the political spectrum, without, however, being a party relying on a single ideology. From the political or ideological angle, the UDMR is a pluralistic and multicolor organization, because it represents a community and therefore it has to comprise several ideologies.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] The UDMR was founded and registered with the court as a cultural organization. Has it meanwhile been turned into a political party?

[Marko] No.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] But in that case how could you participate in the 1992 elections?

[Marko] That was possible due to the Constitution and other laws. The organizations of ethnic minorities may participate in elections and are considered as being similar to political parties. This is clearly stipulated by the recently passed law on political parties, a law that also contains articles on the compulsory duties also valid for ethnic minority organizations.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] According to the law on political parties, each political group will have to register again with the TMB [Bucharest Municipality Court]. I assume the UDMR will also have to comply with this, so how will you register it: as a unique party or rather as a union of parties?

[Marko] We do not have to register the UDMR again. As an organization of an ethnic minority, having the status of a union, and not being a political party, we are not compelled to do as the other political groups do. We contested the article in the law on political parties, which requires that the political parties should have at least 15 branches in 15 various counties, having at least 300 members each, but we are not compelled to comply with that criterion, although with a little effort perhaps we could manage.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] In that case, why did you contest the article in question?

[Marko] Because it is restrictive, in general terms. From this point of view, both in the case of large and smaller political parties, there already exists a very clear selection method, namely the electoral threshold. This electoral threshold penalizes the smaller parties and meets the alleged need that they should rather support the larger parties, thus preventing the existence of too many pint-size forces in Parliament. It would be purely and simply useless to interrupt the law on political parties, even if such a restriction does exist, establishing certain criteria. There do exist political parties that are considered very attractive by the electorate, although they do not have too many registered members. In the West the majority of the population does not belong to any political parties either. Nevertheless, these people do have political options, which they voice once every four years, by ballot.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Within the UDMR there probably also exist liberal, Christian-democratic, social-democratic, and other options. Are you not afraid that other political parties might appear, also belonging to the ethnic Hungarians, that compete with the UDMR, but on an ideological basis, as they might have clear political platforms? Because historically speaking, there were such parties in the period between the two world wars.

[Marko] The aforementioned law on political parties actually makes such things impossible. It simply compels us to have a sole political organization that could participate in the elections. The electoral threshold, especially if it is raised to 5 percent, does not offer us any other alternative. And if the strict criteria stipulated by the law on political parties were compulsory for the ethnic minorities' organizations as well, they could not be met by the Hungarians themselves, let alone the ethnic Germans or Ukrainians.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] As people generally know less about the inside of the UDMR, please tell us who are the leaders of the three or four streams existing within your organization and which of those platforms is the predominant one.

[Marko] As far as our political color is concerned, we have established precisely our place in Parliament and on the political scale, our position being situated at the center, center-right. This can also be seen in our program regarding privatization. We have several further arguments leading to this conclusion. Of course, in the long run there might be shifts within the UDMR, making it move in one direction or the other. But this depends on the options of our community.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Has the ethnic Hungarian community validated that center, center-right position of yours?

[Marko] Of course, since they voted in our favor.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] But they might have voted in your favor simply as their representatives, not necessarily in favor of your center-right position, which, as a matter of fact, was never stated explicitly by you.

[Marko] Their reasons for having cast their votes in our favor could be analyzed, interpreted, or investigated, but there is one thing no one can do, namely contest them. Anyway, we have several platforms. Ours is a multicolor organization. We allowed for the existence of several platforms within the UDMR. We have a Christian-democratic platform, two liberal ones, which nevertheless differ in certain respects, we have a social-democratic platform, and, besides that, we also cooperate with two political parties, namely the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Party and the Smallholders Party. The latter two, however, did not participate in the elections, and the law recently passed by Parliament will put them in a very difficult position.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Which of these platforms do you personally favor?

[Marko] My job is to stay neutral and even before I was elected president I did not belong to any of them. Not all UDMR parliamentarians or members are attached to these platforms. The fact that they exist does not mean that the UDMR is entirely divided or made up of such platforms.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Should we understand that you, as party president, are the result of a compromise solution? Did they elect you to satisfy all the platforms existing within the UDMR?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Marko] One could make such assertions solely if the UDMR were made up exclusively of platforms. But as I already said, even today the majority of the active UDMR members do not belong to any of those platforms.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] When I asked that question I was thinking of the tension that has appeared lately within the UDMR and which might have been generated also by the contrast between the options of your party's members. After all, if they are not private conflicts, there has to be some reason for your dispute with Laszlo Tokes [UDMR honorary president] or the [Adam] Katona case, has there not?

[Marko] In my opinion the press misunderstood these conflicts or disputes, interpreting them as private conflicts. It has nothing to do with the honorary president as a private person. Certain critical remarks were made. It turned out that there are differing opinions, but these existed before, too. For us the important thing is that we should be able do solve such contention ourselves, in the UDMR decisionmaking forums. This time the conflict of opinion was resolved by the Executive Council itself. But of course, the aforementioned platforms do exist, because there are various opinions, too. And the representatives of each of those platforms are trying to play as important a role as possible in the UDMR decisionmaking. But this is not more than a confrontation of ideas.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Mr. President, public opinion considers you a moderate. Obviously such an assessment can only be the result of a comparison with those who are considered to be radicals. What is your opinion on these assessments?

[Marko] I have been asked about this on very many occasions and I gave my answers.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Were they diplomatic answers?

[Marko] I would not call them diplomatic. I genuinely believe that there should be neither radical nor moderate strategies within the same political group. I think moderateness and radicalism are means by which one can achieve certain goals or resolve or not resolve certain situations. From this point of view I consider that one should always search and find the most adequate means to resolve the given situation. It is inconceivable for me to exclude right from the outset either the more radical or the more moderate political methods. That is why such labeling does not mean too much to me.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Is there a radical current within your party, or is this just a pure invention of the press?

[Marko] There is certain dissatisfaction, which, as a matter of fact, is very often justified, with respect to the results of our presence in Parliament, our repeated attempts to engage in a dialogue that could yield results, and our recurrent attempts to find allies and understanding on behalf of our partners. And from this point of view I do understand that dissatisfaction, because in the past six years, despite the efforts we made, we did not achieve too much in our effort to change this hostile mentality. Thus, the moderateness or radicalism existing within the UDMR are not connected to any strategy or the objectives we ought to achieve. Lately a consensus has emerged within the UDMR regarding the goals we pursue. This dilemma of the moderateness or radicalism has its source in the lack of results, in the dissatisfaction I mentioned.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Mr. President, in a speech on 15 March a UDMR member made the following assertion [to the Romanian president]: "Mr. Iliescu, it is us with whom you must conclude peace." Do you consider that ethnic Hungarians are at war with the Romanian majority, because one can only conclude peace if one is in a war situation?

[Marko] If I told you that this is a translation mistake, you would surely reply that this is the excuse we always use. But you are right, in this case there was no translation mistake, because the people who deal with such things can speak Hungarian very well. In this case I believe it was a deliberate mistake.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] It so happens that I like to watch the Hungarian-language programs broadcast by TVR [Romanian national television], and that is where I saw the translation I mentioned.

[Marko] In that case they are the ones who made the mistake. You see, what was actually meant was reconciliation.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] President Marko, what is the substance of your autonomy concept? Which offer are you making to the majority population?

[Marko] It would take several hours to answer that question. Do you want me to elaborate on an entire theory?

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] No, just on the principal objectives of the concept.

[Marko] The main objective is a simple one. Any community has to deal with several issues related to its national, linguistic, or cultural identity, and this identity differs from that of the majority population. This means that the dilemma connected with that identity is also specific. Well, within the area of that dilemma, we

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

claim that we have the right to make our own decisions. Our claims stem from the fact that we consider it unacceptable for a community to lack the opportunity to make its own decisions on the issues concerning it directly. From this point of view there do exist other autonomies, which are not analogous to the one we claim for ourselves, but which can still be cited as bearing points. For instance, the autonomy of the churches. It is quite natural that Orthodox believers should attend their own churches.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] It is, indeed, but the church claims no transfer of sovereignty.

[Marko] I could tell you many things about this sovereignty transfer. I, too, could ask: if the central power were to give up some of its prerogatives and transfer them to local communities, would this mean that it gives up on sovereignty? The local autonomy idea should be valid in this country as well. But I do not think we should go into further details in analyzing the sovereignty transfer.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] That depends on the content of the autonomy concept!

[Marko] It substance is very simple, but those who are supposed to comprehend it do not want to do so. If you want us to talk about the content of autonomy, we should go into detail, specifically. Let me give you an example. Hungarian-language education is not just a matter of the language, but also one of mentality and culture. Who could contest the idea that in the case of the Hungarian-language education the persons who should have the right and possibilities to make decisions should also be very familiar with that language, mentality, and culture, that is, they should be representatives of that community?

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] But mother-tongue education does exist!

[Marko] That is a different matter. Of course, our foremost claim is to have unrestricted education in the mother tongue. Such education does exist, but not in every specialty and not at all levels. We do not have any professional or technical training in our mother tongue. To put it more precisely: the new education law prohibits it. The same goes for the domain of university education. I do not consider it right that school inspectors, for instance, who may be highly qualified, but cannot speak the language of the community should make decisions on issues related to education in that language. This very natural idea deserves some consideration.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Mr. President, there are other countries with old democratic traditions that do not have university training in the languages of their ethnic minorities. As in our country university training encompasses a very broad array of professions, do you not consider it exaggerated to ask for Hungarian-language training in law, architecture, or nuclear physics as well, to mention just a few examples?

[Marko] The countries you mentioned might have old democratic traditions, but from certain points of view regarding the problems of their minorities, they seem to lack consistency. In this country we had our universities, we have our own traditions, in other words, there were times when we did have the rights we now claim, and we do have our positive experience in this field. As to certain university specialties, I think that it all depends on whether there is a demand for them, and on the possibilities of keeping them running. I believe that it would be useless to demand chairs in which no one is interested or where there are no chances of studying in the mother tongue.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] What kind of transfer do you have in mind when you talk about the autonomy of the ethnic Hungarians?

[Marko] I mean a transfer of prerogatives, a power transfer. Such a power transfer takes place in the case of local public administration, right?

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] But in that case loyalty is guaranteed!

[Marko] Does anyone have any evidence about our not being loyal or that we will not prove to be loyal?

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] And how do you envisage the achievement of that transfer?

[Marko] Of course, the two cases are not identical, but in the case of public administration there is also a transfer of the competencies, of power in the domains of finance, economy, in various sectors that have to be led, managed, and supervised by the local public administration bodies. And this is probably what should happen, too, in the coming years. Local authority should be made broader, which actually is nothing else but a transfer of power from the central authorities to the local communities. Therefore, from this point of view, the situation is similar. The only difference is, that in our case there are certain specific problems, such as education, the utilization of the mother tongue, and possibly further domains, as well. You see, just the other day the Senate passed some specific rights granted to the Moti [Romanian people living in the Apuseni Mountains in Transylvania].

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] That is true, but in the case of the Moti these are just compensations granted to them

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for the very difficult circumstances under which they live, which is an entirely different thing!

[Marko] It might be an entirely different thing, but no one could contest the fact that specific rights have been given to a community.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] Mr. Bela Marko, you cannot possibly compare the compensations granted to the Moti with the things the UDMR claims for the ethnic Hungarians!

[Marko] Autonomies differ, but any way one looks at it, this means that a special status has been granted to a part of the population, to a particular community. This is clearly stated by that law.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] In our opinion these things are entirely different, the sole similarity being the fact that the law mentions a community, namely that of the Moti. But let us continue. Why do you believe that the ethnic Romanians in Hungary have not been granted the same benefits as given to the ethnic Hungarian community in our country?

[Marko] As far as legal stipulations are concerned, I do not think that the ethnic Hungarians in Romania profit from more benefits than the ethnic Romanians in Hungary. But this also depends on the claims the respective communities raise. In Hungary they have quite a good law on their ethnic minorities.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] A law that, however, neither grants them the right to mother-tongue education, nor access to Parliament!

[Marko] As far as I know, they do have those rights, but it depends on whether there is demand for it and on the extent of their possibilities.

[JURNALUL NATIONAL] What do you think will be the results of the UDMR-Parliament-government negotiations [sentence as published]?

[Marko] They must accept the idea that we ought to have a dialogue on the issues we raise. Then we need to reach certain conclusions. We have to analyze those problems, without any fears, we should draw up a list of all the existing problems, and then tackle them one by one. It is my belief that we will manage to obtain results.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

FRY: UN Rights Commission Report Condemns Authorities

AU2404083796 Paris AFP in English 0312 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, April 24 (AFP)—The UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva strongly condemned Serb authorities in the ex-Yugoslavia in a resolution adopted by consensus Tuesday.

Although the resolution conceded that "individuals of all parties have committed atrocities," the Serbs were singled out almost exclusively.

The commission, the resolution said, "condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the conflict, in particular in areas which were under the control of the self-proclaimed Bosnian and Croatian Serb authorities."

It singled out "in particular massive and systematic violations, including, inter alia, systematic ethnic cleansing, killings, disappearances, torture, rape, detentions, beatings, arbitrary searches, burning and looting of houses, shelling of residential areas, illegal and forcible evictions."

The resolution expressed full support for the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in pursuing alleged war criminals.

It also "expresses its outrage that the abominable, deliberate and systematic practice of rape has been used as a weapon of war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recognizes that rape in this context constitutes a war crime."

The commission "urgently demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) take immediate action to put an end to the repression of and to prevent violence against non-Serb populations in Kosovo."

This repression, it said, included "acts of harassment, beatings, torture, warrantless searches, arbitrary detention, unfair trials, arbitrary, unjustified evictions and dismissals."

It called on the Serb authorities "to respect the rights of persons belonging to minority groups in Sandjak and Vojvodina and of persons belonging to the Bulgarian minority." Sandjak and Vojvodina are regions with Moslem and Hungarian minorities respectively.

The commission also asked the Croatian Government "to respect fully the rights of the local Serb population including their right to remain, leave or return in dignity and safety."

Finally, it exhorted all the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina to facilitate the return of refugees and bring about the necessary conditions for elections to be held by mid-September.

FRY: Central Bank Governor Vows Not To Print Money

LD2404214396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2125 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 24 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Central Bank governor said again on Wednesday that there would be no printing of unbacked money.

National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Dragoslav Avramovic was speaking at the first annual assembly of the money market A.D. public limited company in Belgrade.

Avramovic said that, although the national currency, the dinar, and the prices had been stabilised, wages were still very low in real terms.

He said that there was a pressing need to increase the country's hard-currency reserves in order to maintain a stable dinar, because the existing reserves were insufficient to finance imports, valued at between 200 million and 300 million dollars a month.

Another problem, Avramovic said, are the very high interest rates of between 12 and 25 percent, although they have been halved since November and December of 1995.

He explained that this means that debts are doubled every six months, which will lead the national economy into disaster if it persists for any length of time.

Avramovic saw the solution to the problems as lying in either slashing the budget or importing capital.

The purpose of the talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Paris in March was not only to revive long-term capital imports for development purposes, but short-term ones as well, he explained.

This is necessary in order to strengthen the hard-currency reserves and obtain the necessary working capital both for export purposes and for the agriculture, industry and the economy as a whole, Avramovic added.

Only with the influx of the additional working capital would it be possible to bring the interest rates down, because then it would be clear that the prices would not go up with the increased money mass, he specified.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In order to obtain foreign capital in the short term through stop-gap credits from foreign central banks, such as the Bank of England, which has shown a willingness to do so, it is necessary to obtain the approval of the IMF and the World Bank, Avramovic said.

He said that Yugoslavia's assets frozen in foreign banks would not be released until the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had divided the assets of the defunct federation with its former members.

Now is the time to settle these problems, 'which can all be done in a couple of months,' said Avramovic.

FRY: Democratic Party on Choice of IMF Negotiator

LD2404171496 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1613 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 April (FONET)—The appointment of the deputy federal prime minister [Jovan Zebic] as coordinator for the future talks with the IMF practically means the removal of Dragoslav Avramovic from this post, the Democratic Party [DS] explains today.

According to the DS, the federal government made this decision because it does not have a majority in the federal parliament for the official replacement of Avramovic as governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

"Such a move on the part of the federal government is more than risky, because IMF representatives already made it clear that they saw Avramovic as the only suitable negotiator. In this way, the federal government is destroying the credibility which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has in the international community and preventing our country from obtaining credits which are vital for the revival of our economy," the DS says.

FRY: Military Leaders Discuss Security Situation

LD2404125096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Tivat, 24 Apr (TANJUG)—An expanded session of the Council of the Yugoslav Army Chief of General Staff [Kolegijum nacelnika Generalstaba Vojske Jugoslavije] was held at the Navy command in Tivat today within the framework of regular planning activities, the Information Service of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff has announced.

The session was presided over by Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. It was attended by assistant chiefs of the General Staff, as well as commanders of army districts, of the Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense, of the Navy, of the Military Schools Center, and of the Special Units Corps.

The session examined the further development of the Yugoslav Army, military, and the security situation in the region, financing of the Yugoslav Army in the first quarter of the current year, and other issues within the competence of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff.

It was concluded that the development of the Yugoslav Army in the medium-term period ought to be brought in line with the changed military and security situation in the region and defense needs of our country, with the observance of OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] standards.

The basic starting points in the development of the Yugoslav Army are its modern organization, professionalization, and procurement of combat and technical systems of multifaceted tactical and technical capabilities.

Organized, equipped, and trained in such a way, the Yugoslav Army will have at its disposal greater overall combat potentials and will be able to fulfill successfully all its operational tasks in defense of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from all forms of threats posted to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In accordance with the adopted conclusions, at the close of the session, Gen. Perisic assigned concrete tasks for the forthcoming period and briefed professional Navy members about current military and security issues and the situation in the Yugoslav Army, the statement says.

Serbia

Serbia: Government, Metal Unions Agree To End Strike

AU2404143696 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 8

[Unattributed report: "There Will Be No Strike"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic has held talks with the representatives of the republican committee of the Metal Trade Unions of Serbia, the directors of companies in the metal industry, and commercial banks, as well as Tomislav Banovic, president of the council of the Alliance of Trade Unions of Serbia, and Momcilo Pavlicevic, vice president of the Serbian Economic Chamber.

The representatives of the Metal Trade Unions of Serbia informed Prime Minister Marjanovic that they had accepted the agreement on the fulfillment of demands of the metal industry workers and that they halted the preparations for the general strike and a protest rally,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

scheduled for 23 and 24 April, the statement by the Serbian Information Ministry says.

According to the statement, Prime Minister Marjanovic assessed that the acceptance of the agreement created the conditions for the increase in production, employment, and the standard of living of the workers.

Serbia: Four Terrorist Suspects Arrested in Belgrade

LD2304200396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1930 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 23 (TANJUG)—Belgrade police has arrested two persons on suspicion of planting explosives outside religious buildings and under cars in the 1992-1994 period and two others for complicity in the crimes, a police statement said on Tuesday.

Aleksandar Gajic, aged 34, and Milan Dobrilovic, aged 33, are suspected of planting an explosive device in the compound of the Bajr Kli mosque in downtown Belgrade at 6:30 P.M. on Dec. 8, 1992, causing damage.

Dragan Grmusa, 38, who was arrested as an accomplice together with Dragan Cepic, 41, is suspected of driving the get-away car on the occasion, according to the statement.

The group is believed to have struck again at about 11 P.M. on May 26, 1993, when Dobrilovic apparently lobbed an explosive device into the compound of St Ante's Roman Catholic church in Belgrade, also causing damage.

Dobrilovic and Cepic are suspected also of dynamiting three cars. The blasts caused no casualties, but the damage was extensive, the statement said.

At the time of the arrest, Dobrilovic, Gajic and Grmusa were found to possess a total of 1.9 kg of explosives, three hand grenades, three pistols, a Scorpio automatic gun, munitions and detonators, and were charged with possession of unlicenced firearms.

The suspects have been turned over to the proper court authorities, the statement said.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic's Visit to U.S. Said Proper

AU2504100396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 8

[Article by A. Zivotic: "Diplomacy Also Bypassing Embassy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit of Mile Djukanovic [Montenegrin prime minister] to the United States has been organized and is in accord with the laws and also the interests of Montenegro. These interests are not contrary to the interests of the federal state.

This is what Milan Brajevic, chief of staff of the Montenegrin prime minister, stated for VESTI. The reason for this statement was the intriguing information that neither the FRY Embassy in Washington nor the Yugoslav diplomacy in general knew anything about Djukanovic's visit to the United States.

Brajevic, however, claims that the embassy in Washington was informed in writing that Mile Djukanovic was traveling to the United States. Brajevic neither confirmed nor denied whether he contacted the embassy during the trip.

The first news on this subject was reported by the correspondent of the Belgrade daily NASA BORBA, claiming that the embassy in Washington had nothing whatsoever to do with the visit of the official Montenegrin delegation headed by Mile Djukanovic. This is, reportedly, what the journalists of the Voice of America were told.

Milan Brajevic confirms that the Federal Foreign Ministry was not informed about the visit because we were not bound to do so. He also confirms a statement by the Montenegrin Foreign Ministry that they learned about the visit from the agency reports, which was also the practice in Montenegro earlier. The visit was, as Brajevic says, organized by the prime minister's cabinet, just as in similar cases in the past.

Montenegro: Federal Bank Governor Enjoys Full Support

LD2404141596 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1227 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 24 Apr (FoNet)—"Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic enjoys the full support from Montenegro," Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic has said in Washington where he is paying a working visit over several days.

According to Montena Fax [Montenegrin independent news agency], Djukanovic's statement in which the Montenegrin political stance in connection with a dispute between the Belgrade government and Governor Avramovic is publicly voiced for the first time, was broadcast on Montenegrin TV last night in a report from a special Montenegrin TV reporter in Washington.

The Podgorica TV also broadcast Prime Minister Djukanovic's statement that "the shortest way to return to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

is the one that was offered to us in Paris," and that "Montenegro will absolutely insist on overcoming misunderstandings regarding insistence on the continuity [of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]."

The TV also said that Milo Djukanovic and Montenegrin Finance Minister Predrag Goranovic had talks with World Bank Deputy Chairman (Milfred Kopenberger) in Washington yesterday afternoon, and that the Montenegrin visit to Washington may result in financial aid for the purchase of two passenger planes for Montenegrin Airlines, and for some other important Montenegrin projects.

Montenegro: Authorities Reportedly Supporting Avramovic

AU2404150196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by D. Vukovic: "Support With Delay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not a single one of the leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] or the Montenegrin state has publicly aired his views about the clash between Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and the Federal Government and the Government of the Republic of Serbia, but it seems from a statement made by the governor himself that Podgorica is on his side. The sending of the government aircraft to pick up the governor and his brief stay in Podgorica may also be understood as a signal that the top Montenegrin state leadership is closer to what Mr. Avramovic wa. supporting in Paris than the reasoning of President Milosevic's "dependable people." This thesis is in a way supported by what Milutin Lalic, director of the Montenegrin Agency for Restructuring the Economy and Foreign Investment, said in a cryptic way in his column in POBJEDA on Sunday, 7 April.

Exhausted Time and Patience

"It is really important for us to desire continuity, believe in it, cherish it, and strengthen it upon a correct and healthy basis. To build it up, we should provide something more basic than anything else: money and the economy. We are certain that on the basis of such a platform, there would have been no disagreement before the departure for Paris, in Paris, or after it. We do not believe that anybody can benefit from exaggerated consistency and delays. As regards Montenegro, we have already exhausted both our time and patience. What is left is suffering," wrote Mr. Lalic, whose opinion may be considered very close to the Montenegrin Government's thinking.

If the Podgorica state media (and above all POBJEDA) discreetly suggested an inclination towards Governor Avramovic, a general conclusion could be made that the Podgorica authorities support the leading Yugoslav "money man," but have decided on persuasion behind the scenes rather than public demonstrations of support for the governor. In an election year, it does not suit the DPS, that is, the Montenegrin authorities, to fall out completely with its coalition partner and thus present another argument to the opposition to criticize the operation of their joint edifice. It is possible that there is involved the feeling that Milosevic can be persuaded to give up, or at least to make a compromise that would help to bridge the exposed gap. The fact that Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, being a DPS man, behaves as he does, is understandable within the existing lack of balance of power that has been characteristic of relations between the authorities in Montenegro and Serbia from the very outset.

Preparing an Alternative

What remains open is certainly the question of what will happen if the Serbian authorities decide to remove Governor Avramovic, even without the previous approval of the top Montenegrin leadership? The silence on the banks of the Moraca and Ribnica Rivers could be interpreted as a sign that there will be no great resistance, just as in the cases of the removals of Panic [former FRY prime minister] and Cosic [former FRY president], and that Montenegrin defense efforts are short-winded. The conclusion of an article in POBJEDA on Sunday dealing with the "Avramovic case" could suggest something of this kind. "Montenegro is, however, not in a position to decide on the governor's fate, so all speculation about this seems to be completely wrong" is the basic thrust of the POBJEDA article.

If this is so, then the most recent visit that the Montenegrin prime minister paid to the United States and his announced contacts "with commercial banks and other financial institutions" may be interpreted as an attempt to prepare an alternative option for the smaller federal unit.

Montenegro: Helsinki Committee on Actions Against Catholics

LD2404150696 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1227 GMT 24 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 24 Apr (FoNet)—The Montenegrin Helsinki Human Rights Committee today sent a letter to Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic calling on him to take urgent measures for the resolution of "the case of St. Petka church" in Spicansko

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Polje near Sutomore, where rights of citizens of Roman Catholic denomination have been usurped.

According to Podgorica-based Montena Fax, the Helsinki Committee says that this amounts to "forceful and illegal usurpation of property rights of the church by the destruction and removal of the Catholic altar from the church and by preventing Roman Catholic church-goers from using the church."

The letter recalls that this is "a church with two altars, Orthodox and Chatholic," which is equally owned by "the faithful of both religious denominations, which is confirmed by the current property registers."

The Helsinki Committee says that an intervention by Bulatovic, who is also the chairman of the Montenegrin Council for the Protection of Minorities' Rights, is necessary in order to prevent possible conflicts between members of different religions in the Bar municipality and to deterioration of traditionally good interpersonal relations.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serbian Officials Condemn Actions in Kosovo-Metohija

LD2404205896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2023 GMT 24 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 24 (TANJUG)—A Serbian minister said on Wednesday that recent armed attacks in Serbia's province of Kosovo-Metohija proved that ethnic Albanian separatist leaders had embarced terrorism in order to sow insecurity and disorder.

Speaking at a Kosovo Polje council session, minister Vekoslav Sosevic said that international factors had made it clear that the province could not secede from Serbia, saying that 'this and similar terrorist actions will be firmly prevented by all means.'

The Serbian Interior Ministry has said that persons unknown killed five people and wounded five others in four separate attacks in Kosovo-Metohija late on Monday.

The terrorist attacks on the police and on citizens of Serbian nationality were condemned on Wednesday in the sharpest terms by the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia and by the opposition parties.

Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, told reporters that instead of open dialogue, there was open violence in Kosovo-Metohija.

Milan Paunovic of the Civic Alliance of Serbia condemned the terrorist attacks in Kosovo-Metohija and said that the only way to an adequte solution to the existing problems lay through talks.

Speaking at a press conference, Paunovic said that the talks should involve all democratic parties in Serbia and Montenegro (which together make up the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Serbia's province of Kosovo-Metohija.

Bora Kuzmanovic, who chairs the Democratic Centre Party Executive Board, also called for a dialogue between the government and ethnic Albanian separatist leaders.

Kuzmanovic told a news conference that ethnic Albanian separatists were trying to take their last chance to provoke a foreign intervention or, possibly, civil war in Kosovo-Metohija.

The Yugoslav left issued a statement condemning the brutal attacks in the province and demanding that the search for the perpetrators be stepped up in order that they should be brought to justice and the people's justifiable indignation be set at rest.

The leading ethnic Albanian organisation—the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo—also condemned 'all acts of violence and terrorism.'

It invited all citizens of Kosovo-Metohija to 'refrain absolutely from any kind of behaviour or action that might exacerbate the situation' but, typically, blamed the situation on the policy pursued by Serbia.

Kosovo: World Trade Unionists Pledge Support for Workers

AU2404095496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 22 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A delegation of European and World Confederations of Trade Unions and Labour visited Kosova over the last weekend to discuss with the leadership of the Kosova trade unions and political parties the plight of the workers in Kosova.

Carlos Louis Custer, secretary general of the World Confederation of Labor (WCL); Emilio Gabaglio, secretary general of the European Confederation of Trade Unions (ECUT); and Edi Laurisen, deputy secretary general of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), met Saturday [20 April] with Dr. Hajrullah Gorani, chairman of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova [BSPK].

Dr. Gorani offered a comprehensive account on the very grave position of the Kosova workers amidst

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

vast Serbian regime repression and discrimination. He recalled that in the wake of the Serbian crack-down on Kosova, over 130,000 Albanians were fired from their jobs on ethnic and political grounds.

At a press conference after the meeting, representatives of international workers organizations said they had not only come to see the situation in Kosova but "to give public support to BSPK in its struggle for the respect of workers and the democratic rights of people of Kosova."

"The violations of basic, fundamental rights here (in Kosova) is something that cannot be tolerated any longer, not for a single moment, by the international community," Mr. Emilio Gabaglio, ECUT secretary general, told reporters in Prishtina [Pristina] on Saturday. "The situation in Kosova is intolerable and unacceptable by any standard. It is a result of a policy that lead to war against Bosnians," Gabaglio said, adding that without a basic change of policies, full democratization of society, would be difficult, if not impossible, for the present Yugoslav Federation to reintegrate both in Europe and the world level.

Mr. Edi Laurisen, the ICFTU deputy secretary general, noted that "there is no single rational, credible, democratic explanation for dismissal of tens of thousands of workers from their job, or for closing down the schools." The disruption of means of communication in Albanian has also affected the cultural identity of the people in Kosova, he remarked. Mr. Laurisen vowed that international organizations of workers "will multiply efforts to expose violations of workers rights at the European and international levels."

Senior officials of the international organizations of workers met Sunday [21 April] with the leadership of the major Albanian political parties of Kosova, the Prishtina University rector, as well as representatives of local human rights associations.

Leaders of the Kosova political parties spoke about the current situation in Kosova and the struggle of the people of Kosova to maintain an organization of their own, a self-sustained democratic society. They recalled that Kosova was one of the eight units of the former Yugoslav Federation, which, just like the other republics, had the right to have its own says about the future. The people of Kosova, in a national referendum and other forms of democratic expression, opted for an independent and neutral Republic of Kosova.

Officials of the international workers organizations were quoted to have said in the meeting it is the right of the inhabitants of Kosova to decide whether they would like to live in an independent republic or autonomy. They pledged they would fully support the peaceful path of the people of Kosova and protect them from further discrimination and cultural genocide.

Kosovo: Serb Police Arrest Albanians in Kacanik, Other Villages

AU2404094596

[FBIS Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No. 861 on 22 April carries various reports on Serbian police "violence" against Albanians in Lipljan prison and a number of villages in the province.

Under the headline "Serbian Guardians Beat up Albanian Prisoners in Lipjan Prison," the report notes that "On 9 and 10 April, the Serbian guardians of Lipjan [Lipljan] Serb-run prison beat up prisoners Sejfullah Sahatiu and Shefqet Baqaj, both from Gjakove [Djakovica]." The report cites the 20 April issue of Pristina BUJKU as saying that "Mr. Sahatiu and Mr. Baqaj were former Kosova police and were sentenced to six years in prison each at the staged trial organized against 72 former Kosova policemen in July 1995." The daily says that "the reason for their ill-treatment was a dispute between the prison director and Mr. Sahatiu regarding a letter of complaint about the bad living conditions in the prison that was written in the Albanian language." The BUJKU report also states that "both prisoners were transferred to Dubrava prison in Istog [Istok] after the incident."

Democratic League of Kosova sources report that "On 14 April, the Serbian military authorities in Kacanik arrested Albanian youngsters, Zyber Luma, Shahip Luma, Rexhep Luma, and Ekrem Luma from Gllboshice village." The report says that "they were arrested at the time they were working in the field with no reason whatsoever, to be afterwards interrogated and harassed for several hours at the army barracks."

Reports from Gnjilane note that the Serbian police on 19 April "arrested" an Albanian and his nephew in Llashtice village on charges of "alleged arms possession." The two Albanians "were reported detained for several hours and subjected to physical torture." The report adds that the police "went back" to the Albanian's home to search for his son, who "was not at home at the time." Sources in Gnjilane say that "the detainees were released, but conditioned to report back." On the "same day" and "under the same pretext," the Serbian police arrested another Albanian in Zheger village.

Sources in Urosevac report that, "under the alleged pretext of being in arms possession," the Serbian police on 17 April "arrested" an Albanian from Nerodime. The report notes that the Albanian "was released, but ordered to report on 18 and 19 April on which occasion he

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

was subjected to severe physical torture." "Under the same charges" the Serb police on 18 April "arrested" an Albanian and his nephew. The latter was "held hostage for a couple of hours and released under condition to report back."

Reports from Obiliq say that "under the alleged charges of being in arms possession," two Albanians in Obiliq were "summoned" to "report at the Serbian police station" on 17 April.

Kosovo: 10,000 Albanian Women Protest Serb Killing in Pristina

AU2404145596 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The killing of Medical Faculty student Armend Daci has caused indignation and revolt all over Kosova. Over 10,000 Albanian women today paid tribute to the departed at the scene of the killing, while his colleagues, the Medical Faculty dean, and the Prishtina University rector held a commemorative meeting. Here is a telephone report by Qani Mehmeti from Pristina:

[Mehmeti] The Democratic League of Kosova Women's Forum and other Albanian women's associations today organized a march at the location where the Albanian student Armend Daci was brutally killed. On this occasion, over 10,000 Albanian women paid tribute to the departed, placed wreaths, and lit candles. As was anticipated, thousands of Prishtina women started their march at 1200 a.m. For one and a half hours, while this expression of pain lasted, flowers were placed and candles were lit, thus expressing a silent protest of Albanians against the Serbian violence. The protest passed without incident, although two cars with Serbian policemen were surveying the situation on both sides of the street.

In a statement for the LDK Information Center, LDK Women's Forum Chairman Dr. Edi Shukriu stated that today's protest was an expression of the Albanian women's discontent with the situation prevailing in Kosova for such a long time. At the same time, the protest called on the human consciousness and the internationally established centers to urgently place the solution to the Kosova issue on their daily agenda. Mrs. Shukriu warned that this form of protest of Albanian women will not be the last. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, at a commemorative meeting, the Medical Faculty students, professors, and the dean, as well as the Prishtina University rector and teachers expressed deep pain over the barbarous killing of the student, Armend Daci, by Serbian civilian Slatko Jovanovic with no reason at all.

Prishtina University Rector Dr. Ejup Statovci and Medical Faculty Dean Dr. Zenel Kelmendi, accompanied by thousands of students, laid wreaths at the scene of the killing.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Vojvodina Viewed as Model of Respect of Human Freedoms

LD2304224896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2229 GMT 23 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, April 23 (TANJUG)—Secretary for minority rights in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, Pavel Domonji, said Tuesday that the province could be a model of the respect of human freedoms and minority rights.

Speaking in a meeting of the Novi Sad-based cultural board of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Domonji said preservation of the identity of 26 peoples and national minorities in the province had shown that the policy as a whole was based on the principles of tolerance and mutual respect.

The meeting said co-existence of different national entities throughout the centuries and their interdependence had contributed to stable inter-ethnic relations, mutual tolerance and understanding.

SPS will continue to urge preservation as well as promotion of the existing level of minority rights in the sphere of information, publishing and education.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 382
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.